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[401] 
Restoring Equipoise to Child Welfare 
Rebecca Aviel* 
Since the Supreme Court’s widely criticized decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago 
County Department of Social Services, the principle that the Constitution affords no 
relief for a social worker’s failure to prevent harm to a child has been described as a 
“staple of our constitutional law.” Whatever might be said about this principle on its 
own terms, it produces very troubling incentives for social workers, who may still face 
constitutional tort liability when they act affirmatively to intervene in troubled 
families—the unjustified removal of a child from her parents’ custody, after all, is the 
sort of infringement proscribed by our Constitution’s charter of negative liberties. This 
Article is the first to argue that this imbalance should be taken into account in 
determining the level of immunity to which social workers ought to be entitled when 
their conduct is challenged in federal court. In a world where social workers cannot be 
held liable in federal court for leaving an endangered child in the care of her parents, it 
is unacceptable to allow social workers to face liability for wrongfully removing a child 
from a dangerous home. In this Article, I offer a reluctant defense of absolute 
immunity for social workers initiating child dependency proceedings, arguing that such 
immunity can correct a perilous imbalance. 
  
 
 * Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. B.A., Yale University; J.D., 
Harvard Law School. I would like to thank Frederic Bloom, Alan Chen, Clare Huntington, Sam 
Kamin, Justin Marceau, Kenneth Rossman, and Veronica Rossman for their insightful feedback. I am 
also grateful to Diane Burkhardt for her excellent research assistance. This Article is dedicated to the 
memory of Erik Bluemel, whose help in the early stages of this project was both invaluable to me and 
typical of his generosity. 
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Introduction: Two Types of Error 
Imagine a child protection worker assigned to handle the following 
case:1 A seven-year-old boy arrives at school one day with extensive 
bruising and swelling over his face and arms. The case worker goes to the 
home to investigate, and is told by the mother that the boy fell off his 
bicycle. The boy gives the same explanation for his injuries. At the social 
worker’s request, the mother agrees to have her son evaluated by a 
doctor. The doctor tells the social worker2 that the injuries could not 
 
 1. This example is modeled after a vignette described in Theodore J. Stein & Tina L. Rzepnicki, 
Decision Making in Child Welfare Services: Intake and Planning 69 (William J. Reid ed., 1984), 
which is offered to illustrate the importance of obtaining diagnostic assistance from third parties. 
 2. In this Article, I use the terms “child protection worker,” “social worker,” and “caseworker” 
interchangeably to denote an individual who is employed by the agency that provides child protective 
services for the relevant jurisdiction, is tasked with investigating reports of child abuse and neglect, 
and is entrusted with some decisionmaking authority about the appropriate level of intervention, if 
any, for the agency to pursue. Although this usage does not distinguish between caseworkers who have 
Aviel_62-HLJ-401.doc (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2011 12:16 PM 
December 2010]           RESTORING EQUIPOISE TO CHILD WELFARE 403 
have been sustained in the manner described by the mother. On this 
conflicting and incomplete record, should the child be removed from the 
mother’s care? The social worker must weigh the risk to a young child’s 
safety against the trauma and disruption of family separation, making a 
high-stakes decision with grossly inadequate information.3 
This is the essence of child protection decisionmaking, in case after 
case after case.4 If it were possible even to envision a social worker whose 
decisionmaking across her entire caseload reflected only the exercise of 
professional judgment in its ablest, most objective form, we would have 
to conclude that errors are inevitable.5 In the example given, the 
physician could simply be wrong—the bruises and swelling might have 
been caused in the manner proffered by the child and his mother, and 
thus, a removal would be not only unnecessary, but wrong—a type of 
error classically delineated as Type I error.6 If the bruises reflect a 
pattern of physical assault that the mother will not acknowledge and the 
 
degrees in social work and those who do not, the convention is fairly common among commentators 
and virtually ubiquitous among courts. See, e.g., John M. Hagedorn, Forsaking Our Children: 
Bureaucracy and Reform in the Child Welfare System 23–29 (1995); Jane Waldfogel, The 
Future of Child Protection: How to Break the Cycle of Abuse and Neglect 5–6 (1998). 
 3. As one group of researchers has described the problem, 
Overestimating the degree of danger could needlessly shatter a family and rupture the 
child’s closest relationships. Underestimating the danger could mean suffering or even 
death. The decisions caseworkers make every day would challenge King Solomon, yet most 
of them lack Solomon’s wisdom, few enjoy his credibility with the public, and none 
command his resources. 
Mary B. Larner et al., Protecting Children from Abuse and Neglect: Analysis and Recommendations, 
8 Future of Children no. 1, 1998, at 4, 4.  
 4. In 2008, an estimated 3.3 million referrals, which included approximately 6 million children, 
were made to state child welfare agencies. Admin. on Children, Youth & Families, U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., Child Maltreatment 2008, at xii (2010) [hereinafter Child Maltreatment 
2008]. Of these referrals, about 37% were screened out, meaning that they received no investigation or 
assessment. See id. An estimated 772,000 children were found to be victims of maltreatment—about a 
fifth of those who received an investigation. See id. at 23. Of these children,  
71.1 percent of victims experienced neglect, 16.1 percent were physically abused, 9.1 percent 
were sexually abused, 7.3 percent were psychologically maltreated, [] 2.2 percent were 
medically neglected . . . [and] 9.0 percent of victims experienced such “other” types of 
maltreatment as “abandonment,” “threats of harm to the child,” or “congenital drug 
addiction.” 
Id. at 26. There is also evidence that a “substantial amount” of child abuse goes undetected by Child 
Protective Services (“CPS”). Some of these incidents are not recognized by anyone who might be able 
to make a report; some are simply unreported, and others, although reported to CPS, “are erroneously 
not substantiated upon investigation due to some overlooked or misinterpreted evidence.” Robert J. 
Lukens, The Impact of Mandatory Reporting Requirements on the Child Welfare System, 5 Rutgers 
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 177, 217–18 (2007). 
 5. Stein and Rzepnicki note that the judgments made by child welfare workers tend to involve 
“estimates of frequency, probability, and causality.” Stein & Rzepnicki, supra note 1, at 21. 
 6. Type I error is used to describe a false positive, whereas Type II error refers to a false 
negative. E.g., Lukens, supra note 4, at 210–11. 
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child is afraid to reveal, accepting the bicycle explanation and concluding 
that the case does not warrant state intervention would be erroneous in 
the opposite way—Type II error.7 
Although it is plain that both false positives and false negatives can 
pose significant risk of harm to the child’s well-being,8 these errors are 
treated very differently in constitutional law. The social worker who 
resolves the uncertainty by removing the child may be asked to defend 
her decision in federal court;9 if she is unable to demonstrate that her 
error was a reasonable one, she may face liability for interfering with 
parental rights that are constitutionally protected against unwarranted 
state intrusion.10 The social worker who resolves the uncertainty by 
leaving the child in the home faces no such risk: Even if her decision 
results in the child’s death, she will not have run afoul of her 
constitutional obligations, as the Supreme Court currently sees them.11 In 
short, the social worker is expected not only to make an incredibly 
difficult and consequential decision with imperfect information, but to do 
so in a legal framework that provides dramatic incentives for inaction. 
The failures of the child welfare system are too well documented12 
for us to be sanguine about these perverse incentives for inaction. By its 
 
 7. Id. Perhaps most challenging, the bruises might have been the product of an isolated incident, 
a loss of control brought on by an unprecedented combination of stressors that are either unlikely to 
occur again or that can be mitigated with assistance from the State in some manner other than 
removing the child. Experts can (and do) disagree about what would be most beneficial to the child in 
such a case, but for the sake of argument, we might be willing to characterize a removal on these facts 
as erroneous—a Type I error, unnecessary removal. 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. Many states have severely restricted or eliminated liability for child welfare workers. For 
example, a number of states provide statutory immunity to their caseworkers for actions taken in good 
faith. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.203 (West 2010); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 626.556(4) (West 2009); 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.421(G) (West 2005); S.D. Codified Laws § 26-8A-14 (1999). In 
Colorado, public employees are immunized from liability for all tort claims. See Colo. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 24-10-118(2)(a) (West 2008). Connecticut provides immunity where government officials act 
within their discretionary, as opposed to ministerial, authority. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-
557n(b)(7) (West 2005). Caseworkers in some states enjoy judicially granted immunity. See, e.g., 
Martin v. Children’s Aid Soc’y, 544 N.W.2d 651, 655 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996). 
 10. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232–33 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 
166 (1944); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 
(1923). The Court has recently suggested that “the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control 
of their children [] is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.” 
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). 
 11. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1989). 
 12. States reported 1730 child maltreatment fatalities in 2007; in 2008, an estimated 1740 children 
‘‘died from abuse or neglect,’’ over 79% of whom were under four years old. Child Maltreatment 
2008, supra note 4, at 55. Shockingly, 15% of these victims were from families who were already 
known to CPS agencies: 13.1% from families that ‘‘had received family preservation services’’ in the 
five year period preceding the child’s death, and another 2% who had been in foster care and then 
were reunited with their families prior to the fatality. Id. at 57. Some studies suggest that as many as 
“30–55% of all child fatalities attributed to abuse or neglect involve children previously reported to a 
child protective agency.” Douglas J. Besharov, Child Abuse Realities: Over-Reporting and Poverty, 
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very nature, the system serves society’s most vulnerable and dependent 
members, and it is overburdened, underfunded, and utterly ill-equipped 
to predict, much less prevent, the harm that it is designed to address.13 A 
system that has been characterized as approaching, at, or past the 
breaking point should not be further stressed with a legal framework that 
skews the incentives for its decisionmakers by punishing only erroneous 
decisions to act. 
In arguing this proposition, I draw from, but do not take sides in, the 
ongoing battle among family law scholars as to whether child welfare 
workers should do more or do less. This is a deliberately crude 
characterization of the debate—the dispute has been more elegantly 
framed as one between the “child protectionists” and the “family 
preservationists,”14 and some very persuasive attempts have been made 
to transcend it15—but I choose it to emphasize that in its many variations, 
the debate considers whether social workers are too quick or too hesitant 
to intervene in troubled families and whether their interventions are too 
aggressive or too timid.16 I argue here that this dispute is one of choice-
 
8 Va J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 165, 192 (2000). Because maltreatment tends to be underreported on death 
certificates, the real toll is likely much higher than official reports suggest. Marsha Garrison, 
Reforming Child Protection: A Public Health Perspective, 12 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 590, 601 (2005). 
 13. See, e.g., Lukens, supra note 4, at 180 n.8 (“The almost universal opinion of critics and 
supporters alike is that the child welfare system is tragically broken and something must be done to fix 
it.” (citing Insoo Kim Berg & Susan Kelly, Building Solutions in Child Protective Services 3 
(2000); Jane Waldfogel, New Perspectives on Child Protection: Protecting Children in the 21st Century, 
34 Fam. L.Q. 311, 311 (2000))). 
 14. See Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 637, 639 (2006). 
Huntington describes family preservationists as “those who disfavor state intervention with a bias 
toward removal” and characterizes their central claim as the contention that “a misconstrued 
articulation of children’s rights and de-emphasis of parents’ rights results in too much intervention in 
the home in the form of removal (or threatened removal).” Id. at 639–40. Huntington describes child 
protectionists as “those who favor aggressive state intervention, even if it leads to removal” and 
presents their central claim as the contention that “too much emphasis on parents’ rights and a 
misconstrued articulation of children’s rights results in too little intervention in the home.” Id. 
 15. See id. at 652–55 (canvassing alternatives to the preservationist-protectionist dualism); id. at 
672–99 (arguing that families would be better served by a problem-solving model rather than the 
adversarial, rights-based model that characterizes the current system); see also Clare Huntington, 
Mutual Dependency in Child Welfare, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1485, 1487–88 (2007). 
 16. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Nobody’s Children: Abuse and Neglect, Foster Drift, 
and the Adoption Alternative 24 (1999); Margaret F. Brinig, Choosing the Lesser Evil: Comments 
on Besharov’s “Child Abuse Realities”, 8 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 205, 209 (2000); Paul Chill, Burden of 
Proof Begone: The Pernicious Effect of Emergency Removal in Child Protective Proceedings, 42 Fam. 
Ct. Rev. 540, 542 (2004); Natalie Loder Clark, Parens Patriae and a Modest Proposal for the Twenty-
First Century: Legal Philosophy and a New Look at Children’s Welfare, 6 Mich. J. Gender & L. 381, 
443 (2000) (“The child welfare system needs to . . . intervene in fewer families, to close cases more 
quickly, to recognize the damage done by its very attempts to help children as well as by its 
authoritarian meddling and bureaucratic self-preservation. It needs, in far more cases than it does 
now, to do nothing.”); James G. Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States’ Continued Consignment 
of Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 407, 455 (2008); Richard J. Gelles & Ira 
Schwartz, Children and the Child Welfare System, 2 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 95, 96 (1999); Martin 
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of-error: no family preservationist would insist that children remain in 
the home of parents who starve, beat, and rape them,17 nor would the 
most fervent child protectionist suggest that a child should be removed 
from a family that poses less of a threat to the child’s well-being than the 
trauma and disruption of removal.18 Essentially, the dispute is whether it 
is better to engage in removal that turns out to be unnecessary or in 
delay that turns out to be tragic—again, typically shorthanded as Type I 
or Type II error. I do not take a position on which type of error we 
should prefer,19 but instead assert that it does not make sense to subject 
 
Guggenheim, Somebody’s Children: Sustaining the Family’s Place in Child Welfare Policy, 113 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1716, 1724 (2000) (reviewing Bartholet, supra).  
 17. Marsha Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionmaking: In Search of the Least Drastic Alternative, 
75 Geo. L.J. 1745, 1775–76 (1987) (“Few would dispute that state intervention on behalf of the child is 
justified in cases of parental abandonment, intentional infliction of serious injuries, sexual abuse, or 
other behavior that creates grave risks of death or serious physical harm. All current jurisdictional 
statutes permit state intervention in these circumstances, and every minimum intervention advocate 
has agreed that they should.”); see also Dorothy Roberts, Shattered Bonds: The Color of Child 
Welfare 255 (2002) (“I do not argue that Black children who are abused and neglected should never 
be removed from their parents. Surely Black children deserve the same protection from injury as 
others.”). 
 18. There is real disagreement over the extent to which children should be removed from their 
parents for neglect. Some scholars argue that neglect-based interventions take children away from 
parents whose primary sin is poverty, many of whom could be loving and responsible caretakers if they 
were provided material assistance in the form of housing, child care, and the like. See, e.g., 
Guggenheim, supra note 16, at 1724. Others emphasize that neglect should not be minimized as a basis 
for state intervention, because neglect can be very harmful for children. Bartholet, for example, argues 
as follows: 
  Many who concede the seriousness of physical and sexual abuse contend that the neglect 
category sweeps in all sorts of “minor problem” and “mere poverty” cases. Family 
preservation advocates often treat it as self-evident that neglect cases are insufficiently 
serious to warrant state intervention, citing the fact that neglect accounts for a majority of 
all substantiated cases as proof that the CPS system intervenes unduly in the family.  
. . . But available evidence indicates that the great preponderance of today’s neglect cases 
pose extremely serious threats to children’s welfare. 
Bartholet, supra note 16, at 66–67. For discussions of the effect of neglect on childhood development, 
see Rachael Kelly, Childhood Neglect and its Effects on Neurodevelopment: Suggestions for Future 
Law and Policy, 8 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol’y 133 (2007); Janet Weinstein & Ricardo Weinstein, 
Before It’s Too Late: Neuropsychological Consequences of Child Neglect and Their Implications for 
Law and Social Policy, 33 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 561 (2000). 
 19. For an exposition of the view that social workers should be more concerned about avoiding 
Type II errors, see John R. Howard, Rearguing DeShaney, 18 T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 381, 406 (2001). 
Howard asserts: 
  Resolution of the dilemma about choice of error should be a function of (1) the cost of 
the error, and (2) the capacity of the parties to defend themselves. Application of this 
formula requires resolution of ambiguity in favor of the child.  
  For a type-one error, the price paid by the child for the state’s failure to intervene is loss 
of life or limb or the eternal twilight of Joshua DeShaney. For a type-two error, the costs to 
the parent where intervention was not necessary may be mental anguish, loss of reputation, 
and loss of time resolving the matter. These are serious costs, to be sure, but less serious 
than death, brain damage, or permanent disability. The parent or guardian harmed by an 
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only one type of social worker error to after-the-fact legal scrutiny. After 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, social 
workers do not have to answer for Type II error as a matter of 
substantive constitutional law.20 What then, is the virtue of requiring 
them to answer for Type I error? How can we justify a legal scheme in 
which a social worker can be held liable in federal court for removing a 
child from his home, but not for leaving him there? I argue that the 
persistence and intensity of the scholarly debate over state intervention 
counsel against accepting this imbalance. 
Let me also clarify at the outset that I do not intend to suggest that 
this is the most important obstacle bedeviling the child welfare system, 
much less the only one. Rather, I focus on it here because it is a problem 
created by the federal courts and one they have the power to correct. As 
I have no expectation that the Supreme Court will correct this inequity 
by revisiting DeShaney, I propose instead a different way of restoring 
equipoise to child welfare: I argue that we must account for DeShaney 
when we assess the level of immunity to which social workers should be 
entitled when their conduct is challenged in federal court, a question that 
has received surprisingly little attention from scholars.21 
For more than sixty years, the Supreme Court has been fretting 
about the possibility that public officials will be unduly hamstrung in the 
exercise of their duties by concerns about personal liability.22 The Court 
has thus developed a set of immunities that, to varying degree, shield 
public officials from liability for constitutional tort suits brought under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.23 At the very least, public officials may invoke the 
 
incorrect decision has a chance to be made whole. The battered child—the Joshuas, the 
Jessica Cortezes, and the Michael Bakers—do not. 
. . . Certainly the social work profession ought to maintain a preference for preservation of 
the family and should not precipitously separate parents from their children. But in a world 
of ambiguity where danger looms, doubt should be resolved in favor of the child. 
Id. 
 20. 489 U.S. 189, 202–03 (1989). 
 21. Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Absolute Immunity: General Principles and Recent Developments, 
24 Touro L. Rev. 473, 499–500 (2008); Margaret Z. Johns, A Black Robe Is Not a Big Tent: The 
Improper Expansion of Absolute Judicial Immunity to Non-Judges in Civil Rights Cases, 59 SMU L. 
Rev. 265, 286–90 (2006); H.W. Mondros, Austin v. Borel: Louisiana Child Protection Workers Enjoy 
Only Qualified Immunity from Section 1983 Actions, 62 Tulane L. Rev. 1453, 1453–59 (1988); Eric P. 
Gifford, Comment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Social Worker Immunity: A Cause of Action Denied, 26 Tex. 
Tech L. Rev. 1013 (1995). 
 22. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951) (“Legislators are immune from deterrents to 
the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty, not for their private indulgence but for the public 
good. One must not expect uncommon courage even in legislators.”). 
 23. These immunities are not to be found in the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is silent on the 
matter. Indeed, the plain text of § 1983 imposes liability on 
  [any] person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State or Territory . . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
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defense of qualified immunity, which forecloses the imposition of liability 
unless the official violated a constitutional right that was clearly 
established at the time of the challenged conduct.24 While qualified 
immunity is the norm for executive officers,25 the Supreme Court has 
identified a subset of officials whose “special functions require a full 
exemption from liability.”26 I propose that social workers be included in 
the narrow group of officials who are entitled to absolute immunity for 
certain categories of conduct.27 
In Part I, I set forth the constitutional framework, tracing 
DeShaney’s distorting effect on the landscape of child welfare 
decisionmaking. I argue that the particular vulnerability of endangered 
children requires an effort to equalize the incentives that confront a 
social worker on the threshold of a removal decision. I argue that 
because DeShaney completely eliminates liability for social workers who 
decide against intervention, no matter how egregious or unjustifiable the 
failure, social workers should enjoy a commensurately absolute 
immunity when they decide that intervention is warranted. In Part II, I 
turn to the doctrine of official immunity and explain why extending 
absolute immunity to social workers is more or less consistent with the 
Court’s current immunity jurisprudence, in large part because this 
doctrine is substantially predicated on exactly the sort of policy concerns 
that animate my proposal. In Part III, I acknowledge that the policy 
considerations undergirding official immunity doctrines rest on 
assumptions about deterrence for which we have no empirical evidence, 
and I explain why that is not fatal to my proposal. In Part IV, I address 
the concern that the extension of absolute immunity to social workers 
creates an unacceptable barrier to compensation for those families 
harmed by affirmative social worker misconduct. In Part V, I sketch out 
 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). When confronted with a suit brought under § 1983 against state legislators, 
however, the Supreme Court refused to conclude that Congress had intended with this broad language 
to abrogate those immunities, such as the legislative privilege, that had existed at common law. See 
Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951). 
 24. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001). 
 25. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340 (1986) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 
(1982)). 
 26. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978). 
 27. As I will explain in detail in the following Parts, some circuits have extended absolute 
immunity to social workers for conduct that can be analogized to the functions of a prosecutor. In the 
Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, social workers are extended the same sort of 
immunity enjoyed by prosecutors: They cannot be held liable for conduct that is intimately associated 
with the judicial phase of the child protection process, no matter how egregious the constitutional 
violation. See infra note 98. 
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the parameters of my proposal, and finally, I conclude my reluctant 
defense of absolute immunity. 
I.  DESHANEY’S Aftermath: Only One Type of Liability  
The principle that the Constitution affords no relief for a social 
worker’s failure to prevent harm to a child unless the state created or 
amplified the danger has become “a staple of our constitutional law.”28 
The origin of this principle is DeShaney, in which the Supreme Court 
considered whether a child’s right to due process was violated by the 
Department of Social Services’ (DSS) repeated failure—in the face of 
overwhelming evidence—to protect him from his father’s violence.29 
Joshua DeShaney was three years old when his stepmother first 
complained to the police that his father was hitting him.30 Randy 
DeShaney denied the allegations, and the DSS took no further action 
until it was notified a year later that Joshua had been admitted to the 
“hospital with multiple bruises and abrasions.”31 DSS obtained an order 
placing Joshua in the temporary custody of the hospital, but then 
recommended that Joshua be returned to his father’s custody after the 
county’s Child Protection Team concluded there was insufficient 
evidence of abuse.32 Although the DSS caseworker was informed a 
month later by emergency room personnel that Joshua had again 
sustained suspicious injuries, she “concluded that there was no basis for 
action.”33 Over the next six months, she visited the DeShaney home 
monthly. During this time, she “observed a number of suspicious injuries 
on Joshua’s head” and “dutifully recorded” her suspicions that Joshua 
was being physically abused at home.34 DSS was notified in November 
1983 that Joshua had been admitted to the hospital a third time for 
injuries that medical staff believed had been caused by child abuse.35 On 
the caseworker’s next two visits to the DeShaney home “she was told 
that Joshua was too ill to see her,” and several months later, Randy beat 
Joshua into a life-threatening coma.36 The damage to Joshua’s brain, 
caused by traumatic injuries inflicted over a long period of time, would 
require that Joshua be institutionalized for the rest of his life.37 
 
 28. See Estate of Bennett v. City of Philadelphia, 499 F.3d 281, 287 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 29. 489 U.S. 189, 194 (1989). 
 30. Id. at 192. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 192–93. 
 35. Id. at 193. These injuries included a “cut forehead, bloody nose, swollen ear, bruises on both 
shoulders.” Robert G. Meyer & Christopher M. Weaver, Law and Mental Health: A Case-Based 
Approach 340 (2006). 
 36. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193. 
 37. Id. 
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A divided Court affirmed the dismissal of Joshua’s § 1983 
complaint, explaining that “nothing in the language of the Due Process 
Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of 
its citizens against invasion by private actors.”38 The Court explained,  
The [Due Process] Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State’s 
power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and 
security. It forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, 
or property without “due process of law,” but its language cannot fairly 
be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure 
that those interests do not come to harm through other means.39  
Nor does the State trigger such an obligation simply by becoming aware 
of a child’s plight and “proclaim[ing], by word and by deed, its intention 
to protect him.”40 
The intervening years have illustrated in acute detail the harshness 
of DeShaney’s decree.41 Even where a social worker’s failure to protect a 
child from almost certain harm can be said to rise to the level of 
recklessness, plaintiffs have been largely unsuccessful in characterizing 
the State’s involvement as having created or exacerbated the harm.42 
Whatever might be in evidence regarding a child’s vulnerability, the 
quantum of certainty that might be ascribed to the social worker, or the 
horror of the violence to which the child was ultimately subjected, 
constitutional tort actions filed on behalf of abused children continue to 
yield the same result.43 In the face of gruesome fact patterns, courts 
 
 38. Id. at 195. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 197. 
 41. See Howard, supra note 19, at 382 (“DeShaney has become a rock on which many a case has 
foundered in the decade since it was decided.”); Laura Oren, Safari into the Snake Pit: The State-
Created Danger Doctrine, 13 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1165, 1173 (2005) (“DeShaney seems to have 
sealed the fate of children’s protection claims against child welfare systems.”). 
 42. See, e.g., S.S. ex rel. Jervis v. McMullen, 225 F.3d 960, 962–63 (8th Cir. 2000). A three-year-old 
child was taken into protective custody by the Missouri Division of Family Services after reports that 
her father smeared feces on her face, locked her in her bedroom for periods of time, and that the child 
previously suffered sexual abuse. Id. at 964–65 (Gibson, J., dissenting). The social workers assigned to 
her case learned that the father was closely associated with a convicted sex offender named Griffiths; 
in fact, the father brought Griffiths with him on several of his supervised visits with the child. Id. at 
965. The social workers also learned from numerous sources that the child’s father had allowed contact 
between Griffiths and the child on multiple occasions. Id. Despite their knowledge that the child had a 
yeast infection and complained of vaginal pain, and contrary to the warnings of the doctor who 
conducted a psychological evaluation on the father, the social workers nonetheless released the child 
to her father’s care. Id. Less than three months later Griffiths sodomized her, which caused her to be 
hospitalized for a week. Id. at 966. Nevertheless, the majority held that “[w]hile the state did do 
something here . . . in the peculiar circumstances of this case the state’s act is the same as if it had done 
nothing.” Id. at 963 (majority opinion).  
 43. See Estate of Bennett v. City of Philadelphia, 499 F.3d 281, 285 (3d Cir. 2007) (describing an 
autopsy report, which concluded that the plaintiff had died of malnourishment, laceration of the liver, 
and blunt force injuries located all over her body); Powell v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 114 F.3d 1074, 
1076–77 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The baby’s treating physicians described the baby’s case as one of the worst 
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remain confident that they are faithfully adhering to DeShaney’s 
mandate, applying the law rather than reacting to the emotion 
engendered by a child’s suffering.44 
Beginning with DeShaney’s passionate dissenters,45 a well-developed 
body of criticism exposes the majority opinion’s many failings.46 Contrary 
to the original intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment, who 
contemplated a federal constitutional right to protection from private 
violence,47 the majority insists that the Constitution operates only to 
constrain—and never to compel—government action.48 As Susan Bandes 
has argued so forcefully, the majority imbues with “talismanic” 
significance a rigid distinction between action and inaction “that is far 
too arbitrary and simplistic to describe the complex web of acts and 
omission through which the government conducts its business.”49 A close 
reading of DeShaney itself reveals the failure of this distinction: In 
characterizing the case as one in which the State merely stood by 
ineffectually in the face of private violence, leaving Joshua “in no worse 
position” than if the State had never become aware of Joshua’s existence, 
or had never existed itself,50 the majority presents a distorted version of 
 
instances of child abuse they had ever seen.”); Tony L. ex rel. Simpson v. Childers, 71 F.3d 1182, 1184 
(6th Cir. 1995) (“[Plaintiffs] experienced from an early age onward some of the most despicable acts of 
sexual and physical abuse imaginable.”).  
 44. See, e.g., Wooten v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 696, 701 (11th Cir. 1995) (“In applying the law, 
however, we cannot be guided by emotions.”). 
 45. Justice Brennan wrote a dissent, in which Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined. 489 U.S. at 
203. Justice Blackmun also wrote a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 212. 
 46. See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Affirmative Duties, Systemic Harms, and the Due Process 
Clause, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 982, 983–95 (1996) (canvassing the range of “impassioned and unequivocally 
negative” criticisms and noting that the scholarly response to DeShaney has been “nearly universal 
condemnation”); see also Theodore Y. Blumoff, Some Moral Implications of Finding No State Action, 
70 Notre Dame L. Rev. 95, 98 (1994) (“[N]either the text of the Fourteenth Amendment nor 
precedent compelled this result. . . . [T]he Court . . . turned the state action component of the 
Fourteenth Amendment into a forceful shield for the state.”); Aviam Soifer, Moral Ambition, 
Formalism, and the “Free World” of DeShaney, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1513, 1514 (1989) (“Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the majority in DeShaney is an abomination. It is illogical and 
extremely mechanistic; it also abuses history, fails to consider practical impact, and demonstrates 
moral insensitivity. Not only that, it is wrong.”); Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional 
Space: What Lawyers Can Learn From Modern Physics, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 9–10 (1989) 
(characterizing the majority’s view of the State as “stilted” and “primitive”).  
 47. Steven Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 41 Duke L.J. 507, 546 (1991) (“A central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
Reconstruction legislation was to establish the right to protection as a part of the federal Constitution 
and laws, and thus to require the states to protect the fundamental rights of all persons . . . . The 
debates in the Thirty-Ninth Congress over the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 confirm that the constitutional right to protection was understood to include protection against 
private violence.” (footnote omitted)).  
 48. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195–96. 
 49. Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 2271, 2273, 2279 
(1990). 
 50. 489 U.S. at 201. 
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the State’s relationship with Joshua that obscures the full sequence of the 
State’s choices51 and the attendant consequences.52 This elision of the 
affirmative aspects of the State’s involvement with Joshua smoothes the 
way for the majority to distinguish the relationship Joshua has with the 
State from those “limited circumstances” in which “the Constitution 
imposes upon the State affirmative duties of care and protection with 
respect to particular individuals.”53 The opinion then explains that the 
State owes these duties only to those individuals in its physical custody, 
such as prison inmates or patients of mental institutions.54 
In limiting affirmative state obligations to custodial contexts 
involving tangible physical restraint, the opinion fails to acknowledge the 
condition of dependence, which justifies and demands positive state 
assistance for one who has been affected by catastrophically inept state 
decisionmaking.55 The failure to grapple with Joshua’s dependence as a 
fact of constitutional significance is expressed most revealingly in the 
reference, as cruel as it is absurd, to Joshua’s existence “in the free 
world.”56 Painfully absent from the majority opinion is an 
acknowledgement that a three-year-old returning to an abusive home is 
as dependent on the State for protection from harm as any prison inmate 
or mental patient in the State’s custody.57 
DeShaney, for all these reasons, is wrong on its own terms. But 
especially in light of the vulnerability of the children who depend on 
state assistance, it is particularly troubling to eliminate social worker 
liability for failures to intervene where the law continues to allow social 
workers to be held liable for affirmative conduct. Substantive 
constitutional doctrine tells us that the removal of a child from her 
parent’s care is an exercise of state power that implicates constitutionally 
protected liberty interests in family integrity.58 In fact, although much 
 
 51. See Bandes, supra note 49, at 2288–90. 
 52. I have tried to capture this dynamic by raising the possibility that the state’s pattern of act and 
omission may indeed have been the most dangerous possible sequence for Joshua:  
[T]he stress of intermittent monitoring and potential punitive sanction by the state can 
aggravate tensions within a household; an abusive parent may very well blame the child for 
the state’s involvement, causing increased frequency and severity of abuse. If the state then 
turns around and abandons the child after having thus made him more vulnerable, 
“inaction” hardly captures the blameworthiness of the state’s capricious involvement.  
Rebecca Aviel, Compulsory Education and Substantive Due Process: Asserting Student Rights to a Safe 
and Healthy School Facility, 10 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 201, 233–34 (2006). 
 53. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198. 
 54. Id. at 198–200. 
 55. See Bandes, supra note 49, at 2296. 
 56. Id. at 201. 
 57. See Blumoff, supra note 46, at 130 (“These chilling allusions to freedom and the ‘free world’ 
lack all coherence in reference to a brain damaged four year old. . . . What is the ‘free world’ that these 
decision-makers envision?”). 
 58. See Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977) (“Here we are concerned with 
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remains unclear about the precise parameters of parental rights,59 the 
Supreme Court has characterized the “interest of parents in the care, 
custody, and control of their children” as “perhaps the oldest of the 
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”60 When social 
workers intercede in a troubled family, seeking custody of a child over a 
parent’s objections, they must tread carefully lest they engage in the sort 
of affirmative state conduct proscribed by a charter of negative liberties.61 
This is as it should be,62 except for the perverse effect it produces in 
concert with DeShaney. After DeShaney, as Thomas Eaton and Michael 
Wells have stated so plainly, “the decision to do nothing is beyond 
challenge in constitutional tort. DeShaney tells the social worker that it is 
safer from a standpoint of personal liability to leave an endangered child 
in the home than to attempt to remove him.”63 Margo Schlanger has 
captured this dynamic as well, noting that “[p]olice or welfare agencies 
may be able to avoid constitutional liability by doing less, because their 
constitutional duties are negative. That is, doing nothing may be bad 
policing or may provide bad child protection, but it’s not 
unconstitutional.”64 
Doing nothing, of course, is terrible child protection in many 
circumstances, as DeShaney itself demonstrates so dramatically. That is 
not to say that inert or lackadaisical policing is unproblematic. But police 
officers, for the most part, discharge their duties in a general way, to the 
public at large. Unlike social workers, they simply do not develop 
particular relationships with at-risk individuals who will bear the brunt of 
an official’s refusal to take action in the face of private violence. The 
children who suffer when social workers do nothing occupy the extreme 
 
the most essential and basic aspect of the familial privacy—the right of the family to remain together 
without the coercive interference of the awesome power of the state. . . . [This right] has received 
consistent support in the cases of the Supreme Court.”). 
 59. See infra Part IV. 
 60. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). 
 61. This notion of constitutional obligation was articulated by Judge Posner in Jackson v. City of 
Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983). In asserting that the Constitution is “a charter of negative 
rather than positive liberties,” he explained that “[t]he men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not 
concerned that government might do too little for the people but that it might do too much.” Id. 
 62. I am sympathetic to the critique espoused by several prominent theorists that negative liberty, 
by defining private spheres in which the state may not intrude, creates a privilege for the strong to 
exploit or subordinate the weak without state sanction. See Robin West, Introduction to 
International Library of Essays in Law & Legal Theory (Second Series): Rights, at xi, xiv–xix 
(Robin West, ed., 2001) [hereinafter West, Rights] (summarizing the key arguments of the “rights 
critique”). But as Robin West has argued, the most inspiring prospects for ameliorating this dynamic 
lie in recognizing positive rights alongside negative liberties, rather than abandoning negative liberties 
altogether: In short, I share the premise that “[t]o accord all individuals dignity, concern, and respect 
sometimes requires the state to refrain from acting, and sometimes to act.” Id. at xx. 
 63. Thomas A. Eaton & Michael Wells, Governmental Inaction as a Constitutional Tort: 
DeShaney and its Aftermath, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 107, 131–32 (1991). 
 64. Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1555, 1674 (2003). 
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end of the vulnerability spectrum. They are peculiarly dependent on 
vigorous, unimpeded decisionmaking that is unsullied, to the greatest 
extent possible, by external considerations such as the social worker’s 
own liability calculus. 
In a world where DeShaney came out differently, in which social 
workers had some sort of constitutional duty to protect or rescue a 
specific child assigned to their care and known to them to be in grave 
danger,65 they could face federal liability for an unjustified removal or for 
an unjustified failure to act. Even if the affirmative constitutional duty 
for social workers were as modest as it is for the administrators of mental 
health facilities, who must show the exercise of professional judgment,66 
on the threshold of decision, their personal liability would be in 
equipoise. In the world that we have, however, in which every indication 
is that DeShaney’s central premise is here to stay, we must find another 
way to restore that equipoise. In the Part that follows, I argue that we 
can draw from the Supreme Court’s immunity jurisprudence to confer 
upon social workers the sort of protection for their affirmative conduct 
that is as robust as that which DeShaney provides for their omissions. 
II.  Equalizing Social Work Incentives with Absolute Immunity  
Absolute immunity for social workers is not so much a departure 
from as it is an extension of the Supreme Court’s existing immunity 
jurisprudence. The Court’s early immunity decisions reflected an 
interpretive method that began with an assessment of the scope of 
immunity accorded to a particular type of public official at common law.67 
 
 65. Susan Bandes exposes the frailty of “slippery slope” arguments that justify DeShaney’s central 
premise by proclaiming the impossibility of drawing a line between what government is and is not 
constitutionally required to do. Bandes, supra note 49, at 2332. She notes that “the proposed duty, as 
in DeShaney, is usually narrowly defined, and would obligate an existing public agency to perform a 
specific (and often, already promised or statutorily mandated) action on behalf of an identified 
individual or class.” Id. She posits,  
  In the DeShaney case, . . . it would have been consistent with due process for the Court 
to construct a narrow holding that the state had abused its power by failing to provide 
statutorily required services to the plaintiff when it promised to do so, had notice of his life 
threatening situation and had indeed contributed to that situation when it returned him to 
his violent home. 
Id. at 2333. 
 66. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982). Prison officials can be held liable under 
the Eighth Amendment if it can be proved that they knew inmates faced a substantial risk of serious 
harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. See Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 
 67. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421 (1976) (“[Each decision] was predicated upon a 
considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded to the relevant official at common law and 
the interests behind it.”). This of course rests on the assumption that Congress, without saying so, 
intended § 1983 to be read as having incorporated existing common law immunities. 
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The Court purported to be doing the same68 when it considered whether 
prosecutors were shielded by the sort of absolute immunity enjoyed by 
legislators69 and judges,70 or by the more limited immunity applicable to 
police officers.71 The Court concluded that prosecutors are entitled to 
absolute immunity, but its effort to cast the decision as grounded in the 
common-law immunity historically afforded to prosecutors72 was not 
entirely convincing. All the cases the Court relied on to reach the 
conclusion that absolute prosecutorial immunity was “well settled” at 
common law were decided after the enactment of § 1983,73 making them 
essentially irrelevant to a determination of congressional intent.74 
A. From Congressional Intent to Considerations of Policy 
The Court was considerably more transparent in discussing the 
public policy implications of prosecutorial immunity,75 expressing its 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951). 
 70. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553 (1967). The Supreme Court announced that it had “no 
difficulty” accepting the proposition the judges were entitled to absolute immunity. Id. The Court 
began by observing that “[f]ew doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the 
immunity of judges for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction.” Id. at 553–54. 
Noting that the immunity is so absolute as to extend even to a judge accused of acting “maliciously and 
corruptly,” the Court explained that the doctrine “is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or 
corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty 
to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences.” Id. at 554 (quoting 
Scott v. Stansfield, 3 L.R. Ex. 220, 223 (1868)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Imposing 
something like a clear statement rule, the Court found in the legislative record “no clear indication 
that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities,” and concluded by presuming 
“that Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine.” Id. at 554–55. 
 71. See id. at 557. In Pierson, the Court held that police officers did not share the “absolute and 
unqualified immunity” enjoyed by judges, but could invoke “good faith and probable cause” as a 
defense to § 1983 actions. Id. at 555. This would, over time, broaden into a qualified immunity 
protecting all public officials from liability for constitutional torts as long as their conduct did not 
violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). For an argument that Pierson was driven 
solely by policy concerns, see Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 Mo. L. 
Rev. 123, 125–26 (1999) (“[Pierson used] a policy-driven analysis which was largely uninfluenced by 
any controlling law . . . .”). 
 72. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427. 
 73. The Imbler Court noted that the first American case on the matter was Griffith v. Slinkard, 
44 N.E. 1001 (Ind. 1896), but did not explain what we were to make of the fact that Griffith was 
decided twenty-five years after the enactment of § 1983, Imbler, 424 U.S. at 421, a discrepancy noted 
quite pointedly by critics of absolute prosecutorial immunity. See Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering 
Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU L. Rev. 53, 108. 
 74. Johns explains that the American criminal justice system in 1871 was in the midst of a 
transformation from a system in which private prosecutions were common to one in which crimes were 
prosecuted primarily, and then exclusively, by public officials. Johns, supra note 73, at 108–13; see also 
Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 499 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In short, 
prosecutorial immunity was indeed well established in the common law by the time the Supreme 
Court decided Imbler; but it simply was not at the time that Congress enacted § 1983. 
 75. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424–27. 
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concern that qualified immunity was simply an insufficient protection to 
prevent the threat of § 1983 suits from undermining the performance of a 
prosecutor’s duties. The Court began by observing that “[s]uch suits 
could be expected with some frequency, for a defendant often will 
transform his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription of 
improper and malicious actions to the State’s advocate.”76 Simply being 
made to answer in court each time such a suit was brought would require 
a prosecutor to divert “energy and attention” away from “the pressing 
duty of enforcing the criminal law.”77 The Court noted that those suits 
that survived the pleading stage would often require a “virtual retrial” of 
the underlying criminal proceeding, and that even the honest prosecutor, 
acting under “serious constraints” of time and information, might have 
greater difficulty meeting the standards of qualified immunity than other 
executive and administrative officials.78 This would create “unique and 
intolerable burdens upon a prosecutor responsible annually for hundreds 
of indictments and trials.”79 The Court closed its policy discussion by 
agreeing with Judge Learned Hand that “it has been thought in the end 
better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to 
subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of 
retaliation.”80 
The question then was how to “delineate the boundaries” of the 
immunity.81 The Court seized upon the appellate court’s observation that 
the prosecutor’s challenged conduct—most notably, the prosecutor’s 
knowing use of perjurious testimony—was “an integral part of the 
judicial process.”82 The Court explained that this focus on the “functional 
nature of the activities,” rather than the prosecutor’s title or status, was 
to illuminate when prosecutors enjoy the “absolute immunity associated 
with the judicial process,” as opposed to the good faith defense that 
accompanies investigative functions.83 
 
 76. Id. at 425. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 425–26. The Court further reasoned that the possibility of personal liability for 
prosecutors would ultimately inure to the detriment of criminal defendants, because prosecutors might 
be motivated to withhold “evidence suggestive of innocence or mitigation.” Id. at 427 n.25. Judges 
reviewing the fairness of the trial in appellate and collateral review might have their “focus . . . blurred 
by even the subconscious knowledge that a post-trial decision in favor of the accused might result in 
the prosecutor’s being called upon to respond in damages for his error or mistaken judgment.” Id. at 427. 
 80. Id. at 428 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 81. Id. at 430. 
 82. Id. (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 500 F.2d 1301, 1302 (9th Cir. 1974)). 
 83. Id. 
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B. Focus on Function Rather than Title 
This functional assessment of the official activities upon which a 
§ 1983 plaintiff’s claims are predicated remains the touchstone of the 
Court’s absolute immunity analysis. In Burns v. Reed, it was the basis for 
the Court’s refusal to extend absolute immunity to prosecutors for 
authorizing police officers to obtain a confession from a hypnotized 
suspect, because this conduct was deemed investigative.84 On the other 
hand, the Court did grant absolute immunity to the prosecutor for using 
the very same confession at the probable cause hearing, because this 
conduct was deemed prosecutorial.85 
Essential for evaluating the status of social workers in this 
framework is that the Supreme Court has explicitly relied on this 
functional analysis to extend absolute immunity to administrative 
officials who lack the judicial or prosecutorial title but engage in 
analogous tasks. In Butz v. Economou, the Court considered 
entitlements to immunity arising out of an administrative proceeding in 
which the Department of Agriculture sought to revoke or suspend a 
company’s registration as a commodity futures commission merchant.86 
After attempting unsuccessfully to have the administrative proceeding 
enjoined, the head of the company sought damages against the Secretary 
and Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, the Judicial Officer and Chief 
Hearing Officer, and the Agriculture Department Attorney who 
prosecuted the enforcement proceeding, asserting that his constitutional 
rights had been violated.87 
Beginning from the premise that qualified immunity “should be the 
general rule for executive officials charged with constitutional 
violations,” the Court proceeded to review the distinct status of those 
officials “whose special functions require a full exemption from 
liability.”88 The Court focused on parties participating in the judicial 
process, reiterating previously articulated principles regarding the need 
to insulate judges, grand jurors, prosecutors, and witnesses from a fear of 
harassment or retaliation that would undermine their independence.89 
Providing a distinct rationale for extending absolute immunity to 
those participants, the Court reasoned that the “safeguards built into the 
judicial process tend to reduce the need for private damages actions as a 
 
 84. 500 U.S. 478, 493 (1991). 
 85. Id. at 492 (“[A]ppearing at a probable-cause hearing is ‘intimately associated with the judicial 
phase of the criminal process.’ It is also connected with the initiation and conduct of a 
prosecution . . . .” (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430)). 
 86. 438 U.S. 478, 480 (1978). 
 87. Id. at 481–82. 
 88. Id. at 508. 
 89. See id. at 508–11. 
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means of controlling unconstitutional conduct.”90 The Court cited “[t]he 
insulation of the judge from political influence, the importance of 
precedent in resolving controversies, the adversary nature of the process, 
and the correctability of error on appeal” as “just a few of the many 
checks on malicious action by judges.”91 Advocates, on the other hand, 
are “restrained not only by their professional obligations, but by the 
knowledge that their assertions will be contested by their adversaries in 
open court.”92 Jurors are screened for bias, and witnesses are subject to 
cross-examination and penalties for perjury.93 In the Court’s view “these 
features of the judicial process tend to enhance the reliability of 
information and the impartiality of the decisionmaking process,” thus 
reducing the “need for individual suits to correct constitutional error.”94 
The Court held that adjudication within a federal administrative 
agency shares enough of the characteristics of the judicial process to 
produce the same immunities, as the role of a modern administrative 
decisionmaker “is ‘functionally comparable’ to that of a judge,”95 and 
“[t]he decision to initiate administrative proceedings against an 
individual or corporation is very much like the prosecutor’s decision to 
initiate or move forward with a criminal prosecution.”96 The Court thus 
concluded that these officials, along with the agency attorney responsible 
for presenting evidence during the administrative proceeding, were 
entitled to absolute immunity from suit for adjudicating, initiating, or 
conducting agency proceedings.97 
C. Applying the Framework to Child Welfare: “Functional 
Analogies” and “Special Functions” 
In the absence of a Supreme Court pronouncement on the scope of 
immunity afforded to social workers,98 this framework yields two 
 
 90. Id. at 512. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 513. 
 96. Id. at 515. 
 97. Id. at 517. 
 98. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari on the issue, with two Justices dissenting from the 
denial. See Hoffman v. Harris, 511 U.S. 1060, 1060, 1061 (1994). The federal appellate courts have 
endeavored to apply the framework developed in Pierson, Imbler, Burns, and Butz to constitutional 
claims arising from child dependency proceedings. See, e.g., Wilkinson ex rel. Wilkinson v. Russell, 
182 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 1999). Citing Imbler and Burns, the Second Circuit commented that “[a]lthough 
absolute immunity has traditionally been applied in favor of judges, prosecutors, and other judicial 
officers, this logic dictates that anyone, even non-judicial officers (e.g., witnesses), must be assured 
complete protection to the extent that they are fulfilling functions ‘closely related to the judicial 
process.’” Id. at 97 (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494 (1991)). The majority of the circuits have 
concluded that a social worker who initiates judicial proceedings to obtain custody of an endangered 
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questions to guide the assessment: (1) whether social workers are 
engaged in conduct that is functionally analogous to that of a prosecutor, 
and (2) whether social workers are entrusted with “special functions 
[that] require a full exemption from liability.”99 
The analogy between criminal prosecutions and child protection 
proceedings is passable but imperfect. It rests on the idea that, like 
prosecutors making charging decisions, social workers are entrusted with 
the authority to exercise independent judgment in determining when to 
initiate dependency proceedings100 and act as advocates for the state in a 
capacity “intimately associated with the judicial [process].”101 At this level 
of generality, the analogy holds, but a closer look at child protection 
proceedings reveals important differences that undermine the analogy to 
criminal prosecutions.102 
 
child engages in conduct that is functionally analogous to that of a prosecutor. See Ernst v. Child & 
Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486, 495 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that it was joining the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, 
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits in extending absolute immunity to child welfare workers who initiate and 
prosecute dependency proceedings); see also Beltran v. Santa Clara Cnty., 514 F.3d 906, 908–09 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (en banc); Abdouch v. Burger, 426 F.3d 982, 989 (8th Cir. 2005); Rippy ex rel. Rippy v. 
Hattaway, 270 F.3d 416, 422–23 (6th Cir. 2001); Millspaugh v. Cnty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 937 F.2d 
1172, 1176 (7th Cir. 1991); Vosburg v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 884 F.2d 133, 135 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 99. Butz, 438 U.S. at 508. 
 100. E.g., Meyers v. Contra Costa Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1987). 
The Ninth Circuit simply concluded, without much additional elaboration, that this “is not very 
different from the responsibility of a criminal prosecutor.” Id. Other circuits have followed suit 
without scrutinizing the analogy in its particulars. See, e.g., Ernst, 108 F.3d at 496 (quoting Meyers, 
812 F.2d at 1157); Vosburg, 884 F.2d at 137 (quoting Meyers, 812 F.2d at 1157). 
 101. Ernst, 108 F.3d at 496 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 102. That is not to say that the circuits that have rejected the analogy have the better of the 
doctrinal argument. The courts in this group, the minority among the circuits, have not been 
considerably clearer in their reasoning. In van Emrik v. Chemung County Department of Social 
Services, for example, Connie and Richard van Emrik brought suit against two child protective case-
workers responsible for the temporary removal of their seven-month-old daughter. 911 F.2d 863, 865–
66 (2d Cir. 1990). According to the court, 
It is . . . undisputed that the [caseworkers] enjoy qualified immunity from liability for 
damages if at the time of the pertinent episode it was not clear that the actions they took 
violated established constitutional rights, or if it was objectively reasonable for them to 
believe that their actions did not violate such rights as were then clearly established. 
Id. The Second Circuit has never squarely addressed whether absolute immunity is available for social 
workers who petition the court for custody of a child, leaving unanswered whether such a decision is 
“functionally similar to a prosecutor’s decision to institute a criminal proceeding.” See Sutton v. 
Tompkins Cnty., 617 F. Supp. 2d. 84, 98 (N.D.N.Y 2007). The First Circuit has similarly applied 
qualified immunity to complaints against social workers, without addressing whether social workers 
might be entitled to absolute immunity for conduct that could be characterized as prosecutorial. Cf. 
Carter v. Lindgren, 502 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 2007); Kauch v. Dep’t for Children, Youth, & Their 
Families, 321 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2003); Hatch v. Dep’t for Children, Youth, & Their Families, 274 F.3d 
12, 19–20 (1st Cir. 2001). 
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Every state requires certain types of professionals to report 
suspected child abuse;103 this will almost always include law enforcement 
officials, doctors and other medical personnel, teachers, counselors, child 
care providers, and other education workers.104 Upon receiving a report 
of suspected child abuse from one of these mandated reporters—or from 
an individual reporting on a voluntary basis105—the appropriate social 
services agency will assign a case worker to investigate106 the 
allegations.107  
The social worker begins by knocking on the family’s door and 
attempting to interview the parent and other adults that live in the 
household, as well as the child who is the subject of the report. If the 
child attends school, the social worker may go to the school to 
interview her. Depending on the nature of the allegations, the social 
worker may also talk to school personnel, medical providers, 
neighbors, or others who may have relevant information.108 
When the investigation substantiates109 the report of abuse, social 
workers typically have two distinct types of authority. First, where the 
 
 103. Jose D. Alfaro, What Can We Learn from Child Abuse Fatalities: A Synthesis of Nine Studies, 
in Protecting Children from Abuse and Neglect: Policy and Practice 219, 219 (Douglas J. 
Besharov ed., 1988) [hereinafter Protecting Children]. 
 104. For an example, see Ala. Code § 26-14-3(a) (LexisNexis 2009), which also extends the 
obligation to clergy. 
 105. CPS receives roughly an equal number of reports from those who are required to submit 
reports as it does from those who voluntarily submit reports. Waldfogel, supra note 2, at 112. 
Mandated reporters are, on average, “better” reporters in the sense that they are more likely to report 
cases that CPS subsequently determines to be genuine cases of abuse or neglect. Id. 
 106. Evaluating the extent to which it is appropriate for child protection agencies to conduct these 
investigations, one researcher has noted,  
Child protection agencies do not have the investigative technology, training, and resources 
that are available to the police. They do not have crime laboratories, finger print 
identification equipment, highly trained and skilled criminal investigators who are familiar 
with the latest advances in forensic science. Child welfare social workers do not have the 
legal training, knowledge of court procedures and rules of evidence and other education 
that would enable them to effectively investigate and prosecute criminal behavior.  
Duncan Lindsey, The Welfare of Children 173 (1994). On the other hand, they have “interviewing 
and assessment skills that are useful in determining whether abuse has occurred.” Id. 
 107. E.g., Alaska Stat. § 47.17.030(b) (West 2010); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17a-101g(a) (West 
2006). Some jurisdictions permit their hotline workers to screen out cases that seem inappropriate for 
investigation. See Waldfogel, supra note 2, at 5, 114; see also Lukens, supra note 4, at 201 (“After a 
report of suspected child abuse or neglect is made, either anonymously or by a mandated reporter, a 
social worker from CPS makes an initial determination whether the information provided in the report 
is sufficient to warrant further investigation. Most reports are screened out at this initial stage.”). 
 108. Amy Sinden, “Why Won’t Mom Cooperate?”: A Critique of Informality in Child Welfare 
Proceedings, 11 Yale J.L. & Feminism 339, 344 (1999). 
 109. “Substantiation” refers to an agency determination, after an investigation, that a report of 
abuse “is based upon accurate and reliable information that would lead a reasonable person to believe 
that the child has been abused or neglected.” Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 4912(10) (West 2001 & Supp. 
2010). 
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child is thought to be in imminent risk of danger,110 a social worker may 
conduct an emergency removal.111 Emergency removals have been 
criticized as terrifying and traumatic for children and, in many cases, 
unjustified by imminent danger.112 In theory, emergency removals must 
be followed by a hearing within a specified period of time,113 but this 
requirement has often been flouted.114 
Second, alternatively, social workers may initiate dependency 
proceedings to transfer custody—legal, physical, or both—of the child 
from the parent or guardian to the State.115 These dependency 
 
 110. This determination generally must be supported by probable cause or the equivalent. Chill, 
supra note 16, at 544 n.51; see, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.401(1)(b) (West 2010) (probable cause); cf. 
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17a-101g(b) (West 2006) (reasonable cause); Del. Code. Ann. tit. 16, 
§ 907(a) (West 2003) (reasonable suspicion); 325 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/5 (West 2008) (reasonable 
belief). But cf. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-821(B) (2007 & Supp 2010) (clear necessity). 
 111. See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 306(a)(2) (West 2008) (“[A social worker may] [t]ake 
into and maintain temporary custody of a minor [if the social worker] has reasonable cause to believe 
that the minor has an immediate need for medical care or is in immediate danger of physical or sexual 
abuse or the physical environment poses an immediate threat to the child’s health or safety.”); Conn. 
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17a-101g(e) (West 2006); Mont. Code Ann. § 41-3-301(1) (2009); Va. Code Ann. 
§ 16.1-251(A)(1) (2010) (authorizing the department of social services to take a child into immediate 
custody upon obtaining an emergency removal order, which may be issued ex parte upon sworn 
testimony that the child would be subjected to “imminent threat to life or health” to the extent that 
“severe or irremediable injury” would be likely to result if the child were returned to or left in the 
custody of his parents, and permitting emergency removal orders after the child is taken into 
emergency custody); Va. Code Ann. § 63.2-1517(A)(1) (2007) (authorizing a physician, law 
enforcement official, or child protective services worker to take a child into custody for up to seventy-
two hours where a court order is not immediately obtainable).  
 112. Chill, supra note 16, at 540–41. 
 113. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19-3-403(3.5) (West 2010) (seventy-two hours); Tex. Fam. 
Code Ann. § 262.201(a) (West 2009) (fourteen days). 
 114. See Pamela B. v. Ment, 709 A.2d 1089, 1098 n.11 (Conn. 1998) (“[There is] widespread 
evidence that the 10 day hearing requirement is an issue of great difficulty in the courts due to 
crowded court calendars. We found evidence in interviews, focus groups, and a docket review of a 
widespread practice of convening the initial 10 day hearing within the statutory guidelines, introducing 
the parties into the record to formally initiate the hearing, and then continuing the hearing at a later 
date. The range of time for the completion of 10 day hearings spanned from 10 days to six months. 
This is a disturbing instance of compliance with the ‘letter’ rather than the ‘spirit’ of the law regarding 
temporary custody hearings.” (quoting Edmund S. Muskie Inst., Univ. of Southern Maine, State of 
Conn. Ct. Improvement Project Report 39 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 115. E.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 325 (West 2008). In some states this authority is not vested 
exclusively in social workers; in Connecticut, for example, 
  Any selectman, town manager, or town, city or borough welfare department, any 
probation officer, or the Commissioner of Social Services, the Commissioner of Children 
and Families or any child-caring institution or agency approved by the Commissioner of 
Children and Families, a child or such child’s representative or attorney or a foster parent of 
a child, having information that a child or youth is neglected, uncared-for or dependent, 
may file . . . a verified petition. 
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-129(a) (West 2009). In Pennsylvania, a petition alleging that a child is 
dependent may be brought by “any person.” 42 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 6334 (West 2000 & Supp. 
2010). In Louisiana, by contrast, a child welfare worker whose investigation reveals reasonable cause 
to believe that a child is abused or neglected must report these findings to the District Attorney; the 
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proceedings vary not only from state to state, but also from case to case; 
they typically begin with a preliminary hearing, where the parent is 
advised of the allegations and of their right to counsel116 and given the 
opportunity to stipulate to a temporary transfer of custody to the State. 
A guardian ad litem is appointed for the child.117 
 
District Attorney is given the authority to decide whether to file a petition to have the child 
adjudicated to be in need of care. See Austin v. Borel, 830 F.2d 1356, 1357 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 116. In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the Supreme Court considered whether an 
indigent parent facing the termination of parental rights is entitled to counsel under the Due Process 
Clause. 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981). Using the balancing test developed in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 335 (1976), the Court decided that the Constitution did not provide for a per se right to counsel, 
but that in some circumstances parents involved in such proceedings might indeed have a 
constitutional right to have an attorney provided for them. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31, 33–34. The states 
have almost uniformly exceeded the constitutional floor, providing by statute for indigent parents to 
have court-appointed counsel as a matter of course. See Bruce A. Boyer, Justice, Access to the Courts, 
and the Right to Free Counsel for Indigent Parents: The Continuing Scourge of Lassiter v. Department 
of Social Services of Durham, 36 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 363, 367–68 (2005). The effectiveness of these 
attorneys is an entirely different matter. One scholar-practitioner has observed: 
While many parents are represented with tremendous competence by public defender and 
legal services offices and by private attorneys, many others are appointed lawyers who only 
accept these cases because they are the only cases they can get. Non-paying clients involved 
in the family or juvenile court system because they have been accused of abusing or 
neglecting their children are among the lowest-status clients a lawyer can have. The hourly 
rate paid for this work is at the bottom of the scale and is capped at a level too low to allow 
for effective representation in many cases. While these cases attract their share of dedicated, 
zealous advocates, they attract more than their share of lawyers who are merely desperate 
for work.  
  Among these lawyers, I have witnessed a startling lack of professionalism. The low pay 
and the lack of commitment to the work inspires these lawyers to give little or no attention 
to the cases. They rarely make an effort to speak with their clients out of court, even those 
clients, such as incarcerated clients, who may not be readily available for consultation in 
court. They often show up after a hearing is over, so that they can receive credit (and 
therefore pay) for an appearance, regardless of their lack of actual participation. They 
readily confess their open dislike for their clients to their adversaries, and their satisfaction 
with court decisions strongly opposed by their clients. In their frustration, many parents 
declare that they would have done better to represent themselves. While they would not 
have done well, they might, indeed, have done better. 
Emily Buss, Parents’ Rights and Parents Wronged, 57 Ohio St. L.J. 431, 437 (1996); see also Martin 
Guggenheim, How Children’s Lawyers Serve State Interests, 6 Nev. L.J. 805, 815 (2006) (“The legal 
delivery system employed in New York City has ensured that most parents are inadequately 
represented most of the time. Parents’ lawyers in New York City have become, almost without 
exception, lawyers who practice exclusively in the Family Court with no law office of which to speak. 
They belong to a panel of attorneys who accept assignment. They are in court virtually every day. But, 
they do very little out of court work. In particular, they are rarely available to meet with their 
clients.”); Vivek S. Sankaran, Innovation Held Hostage: Has Federal Intervention Stifled Efforts to 
Reform the Child Welfare System?, 41 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 281, 283 (2007) (“Social workers assigned 
to work with families and attorneys representing parents and children are overwhelmed and rarely 
provide meaningful assistance.”).  
 117. States must provide for these appointments as a condition of receiving federal funds. See 
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, § 4(b)(2)(G), 88 Stat. 4, 7 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5106a(b)(2)(A)(xiii), 5106a(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2006)); see also George S. Mahaffey 
Jr., Role Duality and the Issue of Immunity for the Guardian Ad Litem in the District of Columbia, 
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Where a parent chooses to contest the transfer, the court may take 
evidence before issuing an order adjudicating the child neglected or 
dependent.118 Such a determination will typically be accompanied by 
what is initially a temporary transfer of custody to the State.119 In some 
cases, only legal custody is transferred, giving the agency the authority to 
monitor and supervise the family, provide (and usually require) various 
forms of counseling or treatment, and make periodic assessments of 
parental rehabilitation.120 In other cases, physical custody of the child 
may be transferred to the agency, resulting in a kinship, foster care, or 
institutional placement.121 State agencies must make “reasonable efforts” 
to prevent the placement of a child in foster care and to reunite the child 
with her family should removal be necessary.122 States are exempt from 
undertaking such efforts in cases involving “aggravated circumstances,” 
such as torture or the killing of another child.123 Dependency cases must 
receive periodic review, at least once every six months.124 They conclude 
when the child is either returned to her family or freed for adoption 
following the termination of parental rights.125 
The question for the immunity analysis is whether this chronology 
of events is sufficiently analogous to a criminal prosecution to conclude 
that the social worker functions in the role of a prosecutor. At some level 
of generality, it is certainly fair to say that the filing of a dependency 
 
4 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 279, 280 (2002); Nat Stern & Karen Oehme, Toward a Coherent Approach to Tort 
Immunity in Judicially Mandated Family Court Services, 92 Ky. L.J. 373, 398 (Winter 2003/2004). 
 118. E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-129(g) (West 2009); 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 405/1-5(1) 
(West 2007); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6338(a) (West 2000). 
 119. E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-129(b) (West 2009); 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 405/2-10(2) 
(West 2007). 
 120. E.g., 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6351(a)(2) (West 2000). 
 121. E.g., 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 405/2-10(2) (West 2007). As a matter of social work practice: 
Three major directives are given to social workers involved in child protection. First, social 
workers are instructed to provide services to abusing or neglectful parents in the parents’ 
own home. Removal of the child is a last resort: it is disruptive to the child and family and 
costly for the state. Second, social workers are told to make sure that children do not wind 
up in foster care “drift,” that is, remaining indefinitely in the foster care system and being 
constantly moved from one home to another. Third, there is a legitimate privacy right that 
families have. The unwarranted or premature intrusion of the government into the homes of 
nonabusive families is improper and unconstitutional. 
Daniel Pollack, Social Work and the Courts: A Casebook 38 (2d ed. 2003). 
 122. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). These requirements are imposed as a 
condition of receiving federal funds. See id. § 671(a) (“In order for a State to be eligible for payments 
under this part, it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary . . . .”). 
 123. Id. § 671(a)(15)(D). 
 124. Id. § 675(5)(B). 
 125. See Catherine J. Ross, The Tyranny of Time: Vulnerable Children, “Bad” Mothers, and 
Statutory Deadlines in Parental Termination Proceedings, 11 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 176, 176 (2004) 
(“Once a child is placed in foster care, the inexorable progress of the case will presumably lead to only 
one of two options: return to the family of origin or termination of parental rights followed by 
permanent placement in another family.”). 
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petition by a child welfare worker initiates judicial proceedings of an 
adversarial nature in which the child welfare worker acts as an advocate 
for the state, making recommendations to a judge and urging the court to 
accept and act upon those recommendations.126 And indeed,  
[Dependency] proceedings . . . include most of the standard trappings 
of the traditional adversarial model of dispute resolution. The state 
must set forth its allegations in a petition and serve it on the parent. 
Cases are heard by judges. Witnesses testify under oath. A court 
reporter transcribes the proceedings. Rules of evidence apply, with 
some exceptions. The parties may be represented by lawyers and may 
appeal adverse decisions.127 
On closer inspection, however, the analogy to a criminal prosecution 
becomes weaker. Scholars have observed that the procedural safeguards 
that accompany judicial proceedings are often bypassed in “real life,”128 
and that for better or for worse, child welfare proceedings are 
characterized by pervasively informal extra-judicial interactions, 
decisions, and agreements.129 To obtain the perceived benefit of being 
seen as cooperative, parents will often consent to “voluntary” 
arrangements without the benefit of counsel or judicial oversight.130 
Amy Sinden, who has represented parents in civil child abuse and 
neglect proceedings, notes that “social work norms and discourse 
predominate in this setting.”131 Sinden emphasizes the key role that 
“cooperation” plays in social work discourse: Because conflict is viewed 
as harmful to children, “the mother accused of child abuse who creates 
conflict by failing to ‘cooperate’ harms her child a second time.”132 While 
the term implies collaboration among equals who share the same goals—
here, what is best for the children—it masks the significant coercive 
power that the social worker, and the agency that backs her, can bring to 
bear against a parent who disagrees with the caseworker’s view of what 
steps should be taken. Emily Buss, who has represented children in 
 
 126. See supra notes 98–102. 
 127. Sinden, supra note 108, at 348. 
 128. Huntington, supra note 14, at 658. 
 129. See Buss, supra note 116, at 433–34 (explaining how the child welfare system exerts a great 
deal of power outside the judicial system, because of coercive pressure on parents to submit to 
“voluntary placement agreements”). 
 130. See id. In Nicholson v. Williams, a federal civil rights suit brought against the New York 
Administration of Child Services (“ACS”) by women whose children had been removed from their 
care solely based on domestic violence against the mother. 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 163–64 (E.D.N.Y. 
2002). The Director testified that “there were instances where it might be appropriate to remove a 
child to ‘motivate’ the mother to cooperate with services offered by ACS.” Id. at 215. Defendants also 
admitted that some removals “are never brought before a court because mothers will usually agree to 
attend whatever services ACS demands once their children have been in foster care for a few days.” 
Id. 
 131. Sinden, supra note 108, at 353. 
 132. Id. at 354. 
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abuse and neglect proceedings, confirms that this power is not lost on the 
parents being urged to cooperate: Parents enter into “voluntary” 
placement agreements, pursuant to which children may be placed in 
foster care for up to six months, “for fear that failing to do so will only 
add the curse of ‘uncooperative’ to the list of their sins when the case 
comes to court.”133 
The divergence here from criminal proceedings is notable: Criminal 
defendants are simply not expected to cooperate with prosecutors in the 
manner that is demanded for parents accused of abuse and neglect. To 
be sure, plea bargaining in criminal cases is pervasive,134 but it simply is 
not analogous to these extra-judicial agreements between parents and 
child welfare workers. An accused entering into an agreement with the 
prosecutor to plead guilty in exchange for a six-month sentence would 
have the right to effective assistance of counsel.135 Before accepting the 
guilty plea, the court would have to provide specific advisements to the 
defendant and ascertain that the plea was knowing and voluntary.136 
These protections are absent for a parent who agrees to be separated 
from her child for six months under “voluntary” placement agreements. 
At first blush, it seems that the widespread reliance among child 
protection agencies on informal agreements has no bearing on the 
immunity analysis, because these out-of-court arrangements, by their 
very terms, would not be considered “intimately associated” with the 
judicial process; as discussed previously, social workers therefore would 
not receive absolute immunity for that conduct.137 But in the child welfare 
system, the discourse of cooperation retains its force even after legal 
proceedings have been formally initiated.138 It remains a critical aspect of 
a social worker’s assessment of a parent’s fitness,139 and judges often 
defer to social workers once these cases get to court.140 
 
 133. Buss, supra note 116, at 434; see also Roberts, supra note 17, at 66 (“Caseworkers are 
instructed to treat the degree of parents’ cooperation as evidence of the child’s risk of harm. When 
reported families do not cooperate with the investigating agency, their case is more likely to be 
referred to court.”). 
 134. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L.J. 1909, 1909 
(1992) (“Most criminal prosecutions are settled without a trial.”). 
 135. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). 
 136. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242–43 (1969); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 
(1938). 
 137. See supra notes 98–102. 
 138. See Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486, 489–90 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[The County] found 
Ernst to be uncooperative, antagonizing, and unwilling to acknowledge her parenting problems. . . . As 
[the] caseworkers became increasingly frustrated with Ernst, they sought and obtained restrictions on 
her visits with Susanne. Ultimately, with the approval of the Chester County Court of Common Pleas 
and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, they changed [the] goal for Susanne from family reunification 
to long-term foster placement.”). 
 139. See Roberts, supra note 17, at 66 (“More critical than the mother’s attitude toward her child 
is the mother’s attitude toward the caseworker. Parents are expected to be remorseful and submissive. 
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What makes this dynamic even more difficult to analogize to a 
criminal prosecution is that it is the social worker and her agency who 
are entrusted with providing the family with the services they need to be 
reunited.141 If the basis for the dependency petition is that the parent is 
incapacitated by addiction or is having anger management issues, it is the 
agency’s role to provide the parent with drug treatment or parenting 
classes.142 It is the parent, however, who is up against an unforgiving 
clock. This is because of the 1997 Adoption and Safe Families Act, which 
was enacted to remedy the problem of “foster care drift,” or children 
languishing for years in foster care without being reunited with their 
families or freed for adoption.143 Under the Act, as a condition of 
receiving federal funding, states must impose a presumption that a child 
who has been in foster care for fifteen of twenty-two consecutive months 
will be freed for adoption, and the biological parent’s rights are 
terminated.144 In contrast, throughout a criminal proceeding, it is the 
prosecutor who is running against the clock to comply with speedy trial 
rights.145 
Unlike a prosecutor, the social worker who files a dependency 
petition does more than just advocate for custody of an endangered 
child: She also must provide the parent with rehabilitative services, 
monitor the parent for progress, and initiate termination proceedings for 
parents who are unable to demonstrate improvement within the fifteen 
month period, working a radical and permanent transformation not just 
on the wrongdoing parent, but also on the lives of the affected children.146 
 
Any disagreement with the agency’s proposed plan is reported as evidence of unwillingness to 
reform.”). 
 140. Sinden, supra note 108, at 353. 
 141. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2006) (“[R]easonable efforts shall be made [by the agency] to 
preserve and reunify families . . . prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or 
eliminate the need for removing the child from the child’s home; and . . . to make it possible for a child 
to safely return to the child’s home.”). 
 142. See 42 U.S.C. § 629a(1)(E) (2006) (“The term ‘family preservation services’ means services 
for children and families designed to help families . . . at risk or in crisis, including . . . services designed 
to improve parenting skills (by reinforcing parents’ confidence in their strengths, and helping them to 
identify where improvement is needed and to obtain assistance in improving those skills) with respect 
to matters such as child development, family budgeting, coping with stress, health, and 
nutrition . . . .”). 
 143. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered sections of 2 & 42 U.S.C.). 
 144. 42 U.S.C § 675(5)(E) (2006 & Supp. III 2009). 
 145. And possibly statutes of limitation. For an overview of a criminal defendant’s constitutional 
and statutory rights to a speedy trial, see Steven D. Feldman, Speedy Trial, 84 Geo. L.J. 1022, 1022–39 
(1996). 
 146. See Garrison, supra note 12, at 595 (“[B]ecause of high caseloads and rapid staff turnover, 
case workers often failed to offer any meaningful assistance to parents or children . . . .”); Ross, supra 
note 125, at 202 (“If the agency drags its feet, and fails to provide the parent with needed resources 
and support, fifteen months are likely to be consumed without any discernable change in the parent’s 
circumstances.”). 
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These aspects of a social worker’s role are without analogue in the 
district attorney’s office. 
Thus, although social workers do indeed, in most jurisdictions, have 
the authority to initiate judicial proceedings against parents thought to 
be abusive or neglectful and to exercise independent discretion in 
making these decisions, they are enmeshed in a relationship with these 
parents that is in some ways fundamentally different from interactions 
between a prosecutor and a criminal defendant. Without guidance from 
the Supreme Court, it is difficult to tell how many points of similarity are 
necessary to build an analogy that triggers absolute immunity, or 
whether the analogy should be assessed on the basis of the child 
protection process as it exists de jure or de facto.147 In short, the strength 
of the analogy to prosecutorial conduct has been underexamined and, 
upon inspection, is less than compelling. 
But the “functionally analogous” inquiry is itself difficult to take 
seriously in some of its manifestations. The idea that, by layering analogy 
upon inference, the Court can effectuate congressional intent with 
respect to certain types of public officials that did not exist when § 1983 
was enacted is a truly tenuous fiction.148 What Imbler v. Pachtman so 
unmistakably communicates, despite the Court’s protestations to the 
contrary,149 is that absolute immunity is predicated on policy 
considerations,150 such as an assessment of the pressures faced by a 
particular type of official; the importance of professional judgment to the 
exercise of that official’s duties; and the threat to public welfare posed by 
efforts to harass, retaliate, or intimidate the official in the vigorous 
 
 147. See Justine A. Dunlap, Judging Nicholson: An Assessment of Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 
82 Denv. U. L. Rev. 671, 677–78 (2005) (“Courts have determined that removal itself is harmful and 
justified only after a balancing of the harms that will occur absent removal—as have legislatures, 
through statutes and legislative history, and agencies, through written policies. Yet removal—often on 
an ex parte emergency basis—is the rule in practice. The perennial battle between what is right and 
what actually happens—the law on the books versus the law as it looks—is often fought in child 
protection proceedings.”). 
 148. As at least one circuit has acknowledged, state-employed child welfare workers did not exist 
in 1871 when § 1983 was enacted. See Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486, 493 (3d Cir. 1997). 
The Third Circuit had the benefit of Justices Thomas and Scalia’s dissent from an opinion denying 
certiorari in Hoffman v. Harris, in which the two Justices criticized lower courts for having overlooked 
the necessary historical inquiry. 511 U.S. 1060, 1062 (1994) (Thomas, J. joined by Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 149. See 424 U.S. 409, 421 (1976) (“[Each grant of immunity] was predicated upon a considered 
inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests 
behind it. . . . [Our result] must be determined in the same manner.”). The Court has continued to 
insist that its immunity cases reflect an attempt to discern congressional intent, rather than to make 
policy, insisting that its appropriate role is “to interpret the intent of Congress in enacting § 1983, not 
to make a freewheeling policy choice.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986). 
 150. See Alan Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of Constitutional 
Balancing Tests, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 261, 271 n.50 (1995) (reviewing scholarly work that characterizes the 
Court’s immunity jurisprudence as “unabashedly policy-based”). 
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discharge of her duties.151 Butz v. Economou restates this as an 
assessment of whether a certain class of official performs a “special 
function” that might require “full exemption from liability.”152 
The federal courts have embraced this prong of the immunity 
analysis, speaking largely in chorus about the need to facilitate social 
workers’ independent judgment by eliminating the threat of retaliatory 
lawsuits from resentful parents. The Third Circuit, for example, has 
reasoned,  
Like a prosecutor, a child welfare worker must exercise independent 
judgment in deciding whether or not to bring a child dependency 
proceeding, and such judgment would likely be compromised if the 
worker faced the threat of personal liability for every mistake in 
judgment. Certainly, we want our child welfare workers to exercise 
care in deciding to interfere in parent-child relationships. But we do 
not want them to be so overly cautious, out of fear of personal liability, 
that they fail in situations in which children are in danger.153  
Other circuits have expressed virtually identical concerns.154 
The federal courts’ concern that the threat of personal liability will 
unduly influence social worker decisions about tense and possibly 
dangerous situations has yielded discussions of the policy considerations 
surrounding absolute immunity that are remarkably consistent with each 
other, and are also consistent with the messages of Imbler and Butz.155 
 
 151. 424 U.S. at 423–28. 
 152. 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978). 
 153. Ernst, 108 F.3d at 496. The court hypothesized that without absolute immunity, suits against 
social workers would occur with even greater frequency than suits against prosecutors, as “[p]arents 
involved in seemingly unjustified dependency proceedings are likely to be even more resentful of state 
interference in the usually sacrosanct parent-child relationship than are defendants of criminal 
prosecution.” Id. at 496–97. 
 154. The Fourth Circuit, for example, has asserted, 
Like a prosecutor, a social worker must exercise her best judgment and discretion in 
deciding when to file a Removal Petition. The welfare of the state’s children would be 
jeopardized if social workers had to weigh their decision in terms of their potential personal 
liability. In short, the denial of absolute immunity here has the potential to adversely affect 
the efficient functioning of the state’s child welfare system. Additionally, the chances are 
high that suits against the social workers would occur with some degree of regularity. 
Parents, resentful of and humiliated by an attempt to usurp their rights, would likely 
channel their frustration “into the ascription of improper and malicious actions to the 
State’s advocate.”  
Vosburg v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 884 F.2d 133, 137 (4th Cir. 1989) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 425). 
 155. See, e.g., Meyers v. Contra Costa Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 
1987) (“The social worker must make a quick decision based on perhaps incomplete information as to 
whether to commence investigations and initiate proceedings against parents who may have abused 
their children. The social worker’s independence, like that of a prosecutor, would be compromised 
were the social worker constantly in fear that a mistake could result in a time-consuming and 
financially devastating civil suit.”); Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir. 1984) (“[Social 
workers] are responsible for the prosecution of child neglect and delinquency petitions in the Michigan 
courts. It is their responsibility, and others in similar positions, to protect the health and well-being of 
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But like Imbler and Butz, uniformly absent from these discussions is any 
attempt to ascertain whether—and, if so, to what extent—social workers 
are indeed influenced in their decisionmaking by a fear of personal 
liability.156 In other words, we might agree that the case for extending 
absolute immunity to social workers is as strong as the case for 
prosecutors and agency officials, but wonder how strong that latter case 
is. 
Were the courts to turn to the scholarly literature for assistance, 
they would find a bewildering disagreement as to the readiness of social 
workers to intervene in the families they are charged with assisting.157 
This matters immensely for the immunity analysis. If one accepts the 
view of social workers as interventionist and overzealous, it makes little 
sense to conclude that social workers systematically fail to act, much less 
that the failure is caused by a fear of liability. After all, since DeShaney, 
it has been perfectly clear that they will not be held liable for not 
acting.158 If, on the other hand, one accepts the view that social workers 
are too timid and do too little to protect the children in their charge, it 
makes quite a bit of sense to ask why and to inquire whether the timidity 
is caused by a fear of liability.159 In the following Part, I attempt to delve 
into these questions. 
 
the children of Michigan. They must be able to perform the necessary tasks to achieve this goal 
without the worry of intimidation and harassment from dissatisfied parents.”); Mazor v. Shelton, 
637 F. Supp. 330, 334–35 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (“It is essential that social workers perform their duties to 
minors without fear of intimidation from dissatisfied parents. If courts allow retaliatory suits, social 
workers would be inclined to act only in cases in which they are absolutely certain that the alleged 
conduct occurred. But absolute certainty is not always available in situations where the circumstances 
require an immediate decision to remove a child from a home. Without the benefit of immunity, social 
workers’ attention would shift from protecting abused or neglected children to avoiding vexatious 
litigation. This shift could threaten the health and safety of an abused or neglected minor.”). 
 156. And even for those decisions addressing social worker immunity after DeShaney, there have 
been no acknowledgments that social worker liability runs in only one direction, attaching only to 
affirmative conduct. The Third Circuit, expressing the concern that a fear of liability might cause social 
workers to fail to intervene in situations in which children are in danger, provided a “cf” citation to 
DeShaney, with no further elaboration. Ernst, 108 F.3d at 496. 
 157. See supra note 16. 
 158. See supra notes 38–40. 
 159. Some of the researchers who are talking to social workers are chasing down a different grail, 
exploring the reasons for the crisis of turnover in child welfare agencies. Although the reasons are 
multifaceted, we know that turnover creates a vicious cycle: Child welfare workers leave in part 
because of high caseloads, and the agencies often have trouble filling those vacancies, requiring 
remaining caseworkers to carry the overload. Families that depend on these agencies not only face 
new caseworkers with whom they not only have no relationship, but who are even more overworked 
than their predecessors. As one report has summarized:  
The costs of turnover in child welfare are great. . . . [T]herapeutic relationships with 
vulnerable children and families need to be reestablished, workloads are increased as staff 
cover caseloads until a new worker can be hired and trained, and meanwhile the ASFA time 
clock continues to tick and the child and family continues [sic] to need vital services to heal 
as they face the challenge of their lifetime.  
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III.  Assessing Overdeterrence as a Basis for Absolute 
Immunity’s Policy Rationale  
One might be underwhelmed by the strength of the prosecutor 
analogy and yet be moved by the assumption outlined in the preceding 
Part: the notion that absolute immunity for social workers is sound 
policy. As the preceding discussion makes clear, federal courts have 
rested their immunity decisions on the intuition that social workers will 
be less likely to intervene on behalf of endangered children if they have 
to weigh their professional decisions in terms of personal liability. This 
notion is essential for our present purpose of evaluating the possibility 
that absolute immunity can correct DeShaney’s perverse inequity of 
incentives. 
But is it true? One possible response is that it need not be any truer 
for social workers than for legislators, judges, and prosecutors. We might 
note that the Supreme Court, in the nearly sixty years since first 
recognizing absolute immunity as a defense to certain § 1983 actions, has 
never required any sort of evidence to support the notion that these 
officials would be more timid in the discharge of their duties were they 
not protected by absolute immunity.160 The Court has simply assumed it 
to be self-evident.161 The scholarly commentary on official liability has 
been considerably more cautious, but much of it has accepted at least 
“[t]he possibility that excessive liability might chill decisive government 
action.”162 
 
Am. Pub. Human Servs. Ass’n, Report from the 2004 Child Welfare Workforce Survey: State 
Agency Findings 14 (2005). 
  This is not entirely unrelated to the inquiry explored here. While the immunity discussion 
centers on the extent to which fear of liability may influence individual decisions in particular cases, or 
create defaults for case management decisionmaking, the crisis of social worker turnover suggests a 
secondary problem: To what extent does fear of liability motivate social workers to quit the 
profession? One study asked child welfare supervisors to indicate whether particular challenges faced 
by social workers—such as excessive workloads or concerns about physical safety—were “highly 
problematic,” “somewhat problematic,” or “not problematic” in contributing to the problem of social 
worker turnover. Id. at 37. When asked about vulnerability to legal liability, 16% of supervisors 
responded that it was “somewhat problematic,” and 9% responded that it was “highly problematic”; 
75% responded that it was “not problematic.” Id.  
 160. See Chen, supra note 150, at 264 n.14 (“[T]here is no empirical basis for any of the Court’s 
underlying assumptions [about official immunity].”). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Bruce A. Peterson & Mark E. Van Der Weide, Susceptible to Faulty Analysis: United States v. 
Gaubert and the Resurrection of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 447, 482 (1997); 
id. at 482 n.131 (“Government officials . . . are excessively risk-averse if faced with potential 
punishment for their torts.”); see also Richard H. Fallon Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-
Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1792 (1991) (“Doctrines imposing 
personal liability on public officials can easily lead to overdeterrence. Officials may tend to be highly 
risk-averse with respect to threats of personal liability. There is little likelihood of personal gain from 
pursuing a course that poses even a small risk of being held unconstitutional, while the cost of being 
sued—even if the suit is ultimately unsuccessful—may be enormous.”); Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the 
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Perhaps the assumption is sound for prosecutors and caseworkers 
alike. Peter Schuck, in his influential work on suing government, 
acknowledged that empirical evidence was sparse,163 but that “the most 
plausible assumptions about official motivation” suggest “a strategy of 
personal risk minimization.”164 Schuck argues that the motivation to 
minimize the personal costs of particular courses of action is so strong 
that public actors will, in extreme cases, “be prepared to sacrifice all 
social benefits in order to reduce even slightly the personal costs that a 
decision entails.”165 Interestingly, to illustrate the sort of socially costly 
decision a public actor will make to reduce her own legal exposure, 
Schuck gives the example of a social worker who prematurely removes 
children from troubled families, rather than risk being sued on behalf of 
an abused child.166 But this example is one of a number of time capsules 
from the pre-DeShaney era.167 After DeShaney, the decision to do 
nothing is beyond challenge, but the decision to act remains subject to 
multiple forms of constitutional scrutiny:168 Did the social worker act so 
 
Code of Silence: Rediscovering “Custom” in Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 17, 31 
(2000); John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 Va. L. Rev. 47, 
74 (1998) (“‘[S]treet level’ government officers may be more likely than their private counterparts to 
be excessively inhibited by the threat of liability.”); Richard A. Posner, Excessive Sanctions for 
Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 Wash. L. Rev. 635, 640 (1982); Michael Wells & 
Thomas A. Eaton, Substantive Due Process and the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 201, 
240–41 (1984). But see Jonathan M. Freiman, The Problem of Qualified Immunity: How Conflating 
Microeconomics and Law Subverts the Constitution, 34 Idaho L. Rev. 61, 71 (1997) (“[P]otential 
liability is only part of the individual’s calculus at the decisional moment. . . . Individual behavioral 
variation is inevitable no matter how well the microeconomic model predicts the mode.”). 
 163. And perhaps intrinsically difficult to obtain reliably—he notes the existence of a phenomena 
called “the Hawthorne effect,” in which merely calling attention to the risk of liability “might 
exaggerate its perceived magnitude.” Peter H. Schuck, Suing Government: Citizen Remedies for 
Official Wrongs 69–70 (1983). 
 164. Id. at 68. Schuck argues, 
[O]fficials tend to reject any course of action that would drive their personal costs above 
some minimum level, what I call a “duty threshold.” . . . The duty threshold . . . is defined 
by one’s idiosyncratic attitudes toward (and trade-offs among) certain values and interests, 
some altruistic, some more narrowly self-interested, that economic models of choice cannot 
readily take into account—feelings of professionalism; moral duty; programmatic mission; 
fear of criticism, discipline, or reprisals for self-protective behavior; concern for professional 
reputation; habituation to routine; personal convenience; and the like. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 165. Id. at 70. 
 166. Id. at 75; see also Douglas J. Besharov, The Need to Narrow the Grounds for State 
Intervention, in Protecting Children, supra note 103, at 47, 83 (stating that “most observers would 
agree” with Schuck’s characterization). 
 167. Likewise writing before DeShaney, Dean Knudsen argues that judgments of liability against 
social workers for failing to remove a child from danger will cause CPS workers to protect themselves 
by removing children unnecessarily. See Dean D. Knudsen, Child Protective Services: Discretion, 
Decisions, Dilemmas 158 (1988).  
 168. See Jeffries, supra note 162, at 75 (“Persons injured by affirmative misconduct can usually 
state a cause of action. The causal connection between harm to the plaintiff and the act of an 
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precipitously as to deprive the family of the liberty interest in family 
integrity? Was the process so irregular as to constitute a violation of 
procedural due process?169 This imbalance means that after DeShaney, a 
strategy of personal risk minimization would entail doing as little as 
possible: delaying intervention, choosing less intrusive forms of 
intervention, giving parents the benefit of the doubt, and construing 
uncertainty against removal.170 The question is whether this sketch even 
resembles today’s child welfare system.  
For some prominent critics of the child welfare system, the answer is 
yes.171 Elizabeth Bartholet, for example, has characterized the child 
welfare system as one in which “[w]e try to avoid removing children from 
their families at all costs and to return children who are removed as 
quickly as possible.”172 She asserts that “the state is too reluctant to 
respond to serious child maltreatment with coercive measures, to remove 
children from harm’s way, and to terminate parental rights so that 
children can be moved on to safe, nurturing families.”173 Richard Gelles 
and Ira Schwartz argue that the child welfare system is premised upon an 
ideological commitment to the notion that children should remain with 
their biological parents, and that the system prioritizes parents’ rights at 
 
identifiable defendant is typically clear. In contrast, those injured by a failure to act find it difficult to 
bring suit. The causal connection between the plaintiff’s injury and an officer’s inaction may be 
indirect and obscure. . . . In consequence, the risk of being sued for erroneous or improper action is 
vastly greater than is the risk of being sued for erroneous or improper (and perhaps equally costly) 
inaction. This imbalance increases the incentive to protect oneself by doing less.”). 
 169. See supra notes 58–64. 
 170. This is what a strategy of personal risk minimization would look like when the risk we are 
speaking of is the risk of liability. What DeShaney left untouched, and what no court could eliminate, 
is the fear of other risks faced by social workers, such as job discipline or adverse publicity stemming 
from the death of a child left with, or returned to, his biological parents. Fear of these consequences 
may continue to influence social worker decisionmaking in favor of intervention and removal. The 
federal courts have not even acknowledged these countervailing forces operating upon social worker 
decisionmaking, much less articulated any formula or method for balancing the fear of liability for 
unwarranted intervention against the fear of adverse publicity for failing to timely intervene. 
However, some commentators continue to speak of fear of job discipline, fear of liability, and fear of 
adverse publicity as factors that can be grouped together to produce “unnecessary removals” in a 
phenomenon that could be described as “defensive social work.” See Chill, supra note 16, at 542 (citing 
Douglas J. Besharov, Protecting Abused and Neglected Children: Can Law Help Social Work?, 7 Child 
Abuse & Neglect 4, 421–34 (1983)). Post-DeShaney, these fears run in different directions, and their 
effects on social worker decisionmaking must be disaggregated to be meaningful. 
 171. Some of these characterizations of the child welfare system obviously cannot serve as 
evidence that caseworkers fail to intervene as warranted for fear of liability. Indeed, Gelles, Schwartz, 
and Dwyer all suggest substantive ideological reasons for what they perceive as caseworkers’ timidity. 
But in describing caseworkers as systematically reluctant to remove children from their homes, their 
portrayal is at least reconcilable with the federal courts’ concern about overly cautious caseworkers 
whose hesitation to intervene may place vulnerable children at risk. See Dwyer, supra note 16, at 442–
67; Gelles & Schwartz, supra note 16. 
 172. See Bartholet, supra note 16, at 24 (“Family preservation has always been the dominant 
modus operandi in the child welfare system.”). 
 173. Id. at 235 (describing the views of family preservation critics). 
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the expense of child protection.174 James Dwyer asserts that social 
workers have an “adult-centered orientation” and “view their ‘clients’ as 
the dysfunctional parents, not the maltreated children.”175 Dwyer writes: 
In discussing policy reforms with local and state-level CPS officials in 
Virginia, I most often heard objections couched in terms of parents’ 
rights rather than in terms of child welfare. When I give presentations 
to CPS social workers and directors and I raise this concern, there are 
always a couple who approach me afterwards, and, in hushed tones, say 
something to the effect of “it is so true; CPS is all about helping parents 
and giving them every last chance, not about doing what is best for the 
children.”176 
However, the child welfare system has been criticized just as 
vehemently for intervening too readily and too intrusively, for riding 
roughshod over the constitutional rights of parents, particularly parents 
of color, and for disregarding the trauma and stress of family 
separation.177 Although the overwhelming majority of children in the 
child welfare system—about 89%—remain in their homes, rather than 
being placed in foster care,178 critics see a system that is eager to remove 
children from their parents and does so without careful evaluation of the 
costs and benefits. Theo Liebmann, criticizing what he views as 
amorphous and overly permissive removal standards, notes that removal 
from a parent has been shown to present risk of various forms of 
separation anxiety, depression, and other mental health problems, and 
asserts that “the decision to remove a child is made in a vacuum utterly 
devoid of these very real facts.”179 Paul Chill, focusing his critique on the 
procedural defects of emergency removals, has also noted the “harsh 
human impact” of removal and has argued that the number of 
unnecessary removals is “large and growing.”180 
 
 174. See Gelles & Schwartz, supra note 16, at 99–102. They argue that the child welfare system is 
predicated on seven core beliefs, including the beliefs that parents want to and can change their 
abusive and neglectful behavior, that change can be achieved if there are sufficient resources, that a 
safe and lasting family reunification can be achieved with sufficient resources, and that children do 
best when raised by their biological parents. Id. 
 175. Dwyer, supra note 16, at 455. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. Mich. J.L. 
Reform 683, 772–74 (2001); Huntington, supra note 14, at 656–63; see also Roberts, supra note 17, at 
225 (stating that African American children are overrepresented in the child welfare system, which 
further disadvantages black Americans “as a group”). 
 178. Patricia L. Kohl, Casey-CSSP Alliance for Racial Equity in Child Welfare, 
Unsuccessful In-Home Child Welfare Service Plans Following a Maltreatment Investigation: 
Racial and Ethnic Differences 5 (2007); see also Waldfogel, supra note 2, at 208 (“[O]nly a small 
share of the children reported are subsequently removed from their homes. Indeed, most children 
reported to CPS receive no intervention beyond an initial screening or investigation . . . .”). 
 179. Theo Liebmann, What’s Missing from Foster Care Reform? The Need for Comprehensive, 
Realistic, and Compassionate Removal Standards, 28 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol’y 141, 148 (2007). 
 180. Chill, supra note 16, at 541–42. 
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At times the preservationist portraits of the child welfare system are 
virtually unrecognizable from those painted by the protectionists, 
although they are certainly no less condemnatory. Consider the following 
statement made by Martin Guggenheim, a prominent preservationist, 
describing what he views as the attitude towards parents involved in the 
system: 
It is the element of hatred that I wish to mention for a minute. There is 
a shocking presumption generated by fear, by otherness, by a lot of 
things—that the parents of children in foster care are bad for their 
children. They don’t love them enough or they don’t have the ability 
enough to raise them well. And I’m here to say that in my 30 years of 
work in this field, that is the most despicable slander of all, and the 
most difficult falsity to refute.181 
This presents a remarkable contrast to the experiences relayed by 
Dwyer, who reports that an official attested that her agency would never 
seek to terminate parental rights without pursuing rehabilitation and 
reunification,182 because “we don’t give up on parents . . . you never know 
when someone might change.”183 Other researchers have also found that  
[o]ne of the unique qualities of the child welfare social worker, derived 
from professional training, is that he or she often focuses on the 
strengths of the parents even in severe abuse cases. . . . [A]t each stage 
of the decision-making process caseworkers tend to favor the least 
stigmatizing interpretation of available information and the least 
coercive disposition.184 
How can we reconcile these competing views of the child welfare 
system? The answer, I think, is that underlying these seemingly 
conflicting visions is the painful truth that agencies all over the country 
are too burdened with excessive caseloads and inadequate funding to 
apply a sensitive filter to reports of child abuse.185 Some will err on the 
 
 181. Symposium, The Rights of Parents with Children in Foster Care: Removals Arising from 
Economic Hardship and the Predictive Power of Race, 6 N.Y. City L. Rev. 61, 74 (2003). 
 182. While states are required to pursue reunification in the majority of cases, they are exempted 
from such efforts in cases involving “aggravated circumstances” such as abandonment, torture, or the 
killing of another child. See Dwyer, supra note 16, at 437–38. 
 183. Id. at 454. For an interesting perspective on a bias towards parents in the criminal justice 
system, see Jennifer M. Collins, Lady Madonna, Children at Your Feet: The Criminal Justice System’s 
Romanticization of the Parent-Child Relationship, 93 Iowa L. Rev. 131 (2007) (asserting that in cases 
of violence against children, parental offenders are systematically treated better by the criminal justice 
system than are extrafamilial offenders, due to the idealization of the parent-child bond). Collins notes 
an “identification phenomenon,” quoting frustrated prosecutors who have observed that “juries 
identify with the accused, believing any parent can make a mistake. . . . Most members of the general 
public have been stressed themselves by child care responsibilities and feel some sense of sympathy for 
the abuser, who is seen as having lost control.” Id. at 154. 
 184. Lindsey, supra note 106, at 174 n.77. 
 185. See, e.g., Waldfogel, supra note 2, at 26–27. Waldfogel’s study of Boston case records 
suggests both that “the American child protective services system is investigating many families 
unnecessarily,” and that “the system does not always intervene aggressively enough in very high-risk 
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side of intervention;186 some will err on the side of hesitation;187 all will 
err,188 even more frequently than whatever might be the inevitable 
baseline rate of error inherent in any enterprise that is not only 
investigative, but also predictive. These predictions will be wrong in both 
directions, offering ample fodder both for the protectionists to decry 
failures to intervene and for the preservationists to decry unnecessary 
interventions that cause harm and do no good. This debate is about the 
better way to be wrong, whether social workers should err on the side of 
inaction or err on the side of intervention. 
My objective here is not to resolve this debate but to point out that 
that rejecting absolute immunity in a post-DeShaney world is to accept 
that only erring on the side of intervention is redressable, and that only 
erring on the side of intervention poses a threat to a social worker’s 
personal liability. This produces a bias for inaction in the legal 
framework that should make us uncomfortable, even though we do not 
 
cases.” Id. She observes that the system suffers from both overinclusion (families in the system who 
should not be there) and underinclusion (families who should be receiving child protective services 
who are not). Id. at 84–85. As she puts it: 
In too many high-risk cases, repeated warnings are ignored or misread, and children are left 
to suffer at the hands of cruel or incompetent parents. And in too many low-risk cases, 
struggling families receive only a heavy-handed investigation, but no real services to help 
them become better caregivers for their children.  
Id. at 208. 
 186. For an excellent overview of studies confirming the very low rate of reliability in the selection 
of children for placement in foster care, which causes children who need placement to be left in their 
homes while children with lesser placement needs were removed from their families, see Lindsey, 
supra note 106, at 133–38. One study suggested, 
[J]udgments of protective service workers about the severity of child abuse and neglect 
cases . . . varied as a function of the severity of social and economic problems in the areas 
served by protective service staff. Specifically, workers in district offices with more sever 
caseloads judged vignettes provided by the author as less severe. Conversely, workers from 
offices with less severe caseloads judged the vignettes as more severe. 
Stein & Rzepnicki, supra note 1, at 8 (citing Isabel Wolock, Community Characteristics and Staff 
Judgments in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 18 No. 2 Social Work Research & Abstracts 9–15 
(1982)). 
 187. See, e.g., Kurt Mundorff, Children as Chattel: Invoking the Thirteenth Amendment to Reform 
Child Welfare, 1 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J. 131, 153–54 (2003) (“[The] lack of coherent 
standards results in massive inconsistencies within agencies and within the system as a whole. . . . Some 
supervisors were cautious about removals, conducting them only after a careful investigation. Some 
ordered them on only the slightest allegations and conducted the investigation subsequently, if at all. 
Each investigative unit developed its own culture, its own definitions, and its own standards for 
investigation. These inconsistencies are reflected in local and national child protection data. One study 
compared the data of twenty-eight states and found tremendous variation between the rates of 
substantiation and the type of maltreatment found.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 188. At least one scholar has argued that one type of error actually causes the other. See Besharov, 
supra note 166, at 48 (“The system is so overburdened with cases of insubstantial or unproven risk to 
children that it does not respond forcefully to situations where children are in real danger.”). 
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know how responsive social workers are to this bias.189 It is true that we 
have virtually no empirical evidence confirming that social workers fail 
to act out of fear of personal liability, but the assumption is at least 
plausible, and the possibility that even a small handful of endangered 
children who should be removed from their homes would suffer from a 
social worker’s personal liability calculus is deeply troubling. Until an 
appropriate empirical study disproves the federal courts’ assumption that 
the possibility of such liability—attenuated as it would be under a 
qualified immunity regime—would cause hesitation, delay, and inaction 
in child welfare professionals, we should strive for parity in the legal 
consequences that attend caseworker decisionmaking. 
There is insight to be gleaned from the very persistence of the 
scholarly dispute over the wisdom and efficacy of state intervention in 
troubled families. The fact that scholars cannot agree on whether 
caseworkers should be more or less reluctant to intervene itself supports 
parity. We can expect that an observer who views the child welfare 
system as overly intrusive would be resistant to the suggestion that 
unwarranted and damaging interventions would be insulated from 
federal review for constitutional error. After all, preservationist scholars 
have been vocal about the harms that flow from unwarranted 
intrusions,190 and some of them have explicitly addressed the 
constitutional implications of these intrusions.191 But it is quite another 
matter to propose that making caseworkers personally liable for action 
but not for omission is an appropriate mechanism with which to reduce 
these interventions—that federal liability should by design cause child 
welfare workers to hesitate before intervening, where the post-DeShaney 
landscape provides no comparable reason to be fearful about the legal 
consequences of inaction. Such a proposal could be justified only by a 
high degree of certainty that child welfare workers systematically over-
intervene and rarely, if ever, fail to act where warranted. As discussed 
above, the literature simply does not support that type of certainty. 
 
 189. The National Center of Child Abuse and Neglect (“NCCAN”) invited public comment on 
proposed funding priorities for child maltreatment research for fiscal years 1997–2001. Children’s 
Bureau/National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect Proposed Research Priorities for Fiscal Years 
1997–2001, 62 Fed. Reg. 6546-01 (proposed Feb. 12, 1997). In response, the National Association of 
Social Workers (NASW) proffered as one of its top eight priorities: “[e]xamination of the extent to 
which child welfare workers’ fear of both criminal and civil liability charges—given the increasingly 
litigious practice environment—inhibit timely and appropriate intervention, and thus, render less than 
efficacious treatment.” Nat’l Ass’n Soc. Workers, NASW Comments on Proposed Priorities for 
Child Abuse and Neglect Research (1997), http://www.socialworkers.org/archives/advocacy/ 
updates/1997/ltrchild.htm. It appears that such a study was not funded by NCCAN. 
 190. See, e.g., Liebmann, supra note 179, at 169–71.  
 191. See id. at 154–62; see also Guggenheim, supra note 16, at 1742–43. 
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Instead, the most convincing portrayals indicate a system rife with both 
over- and underinclusion.192 
The horror stories abound, illuminating both types of failure in 
excruciating detail.193 That is why it is no answer to object to absolute 
immunity on the grounds that child welfare workers have ruined the lives 
of too many families with aggressive, unwarranted intrusions. These 
unnecessary interventions do not explain away the all-too-numerous 
failures to intervene in other cases, where a child’s health or safety is 
demonstrably at risk. Because these failures are also numerous, instances 
of overintervention cannot be invoked as though they conclusively 
demonstrate that absolute immunity for caseworkers is unnecessary or 
unwise, as too many caseworkers are already doing too much. In other 
words, one can accept, as I do, that too many interventions are 
precipitous and damaging, and yet remain unsatisfied that retaining 
caseworker liability only for affirmative error is a good way to reduce 
these unnecessary interventions. 
It is closer to the mark to conclude despairingly that the system fails 
so haphazardly—or perhaps predictably—in both directions, and is 
subject to so many inputs, that it is perhaps simply unresponsive to 
federal immunity doctrines. But in evaluating this possibility as well, we 
return to the same question: Is it sound to use this uncertainty about the 
actual effect of official liability as a basis to discard our concerns about 
DeShaney’s skewed incentives? I would argue, to the contrary, that we 
should be unwilling to accept these skewed incentives unless and until we 
can conclusively determine that they have no effect on social worker 
decisionmaking. 
In fact, parity in the legal consequences that attend child welfare 
decisionmaking may even be a prerequisite to getting accurate empirical 
data about social worker responsiveness to the incentives created by 
liability rules. Imagine that a social worker participating in an empirical 
study is presented with a fact pattern about a child that appears to be at 
risk of harm; the social worker is then asked to state whether or not it 
would be appropriate to remove the child from the home in such 
circumstances. The study is designed so that this response, perhaps in 
 
 192. See Lindsey, supra note 106, at 133–36; Waldfogel, supra note 2, at 84–85; Besharov, supra 
note 166, at 48; see also Besharov, supra note 12, at 199–200 (“Social agencies fail to protect children 
who need help the most—the victims of physical brutality—by not removing them from their abusive 
parents. At the same time, they overreact to cases of social deprivation in poor families.”). 
 193. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 212–16 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (describing the 
plight of children unjustifiably separated from their loving but battered mothers and placed into the 
homes of foster parents who then batter them); Bartholet, supra note 16, at 107 (describing the 
testimony of the administrator of a home for abused children, revealing multiple instances of children 
sent home to their parents in spite of having received third degree burns, skull fractures, and in the 
case of one infant of fifteen months, venereal warts). 
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combination with responses to other vignettes or interview questions, is 
intended to serve as a sort of baseline against which to measure the 
effects of liability concerns on optimal child welfare decisionmaking. But 
if the social worker is aware that removing the child may expose her to 
personal liability, while leaving the child in the home presents no such 
threat, that recognition may skew her response at some level, making it 
impossible to develop the necessary baseline. 
Unfortunately, after DeShaney, the only way to equalize the 
incentives on either side of a removal decision is to equalize down to 
nothing, eliminating the prospect of compensation for those individuals 
harmed by affirmative social worker conduct. In the next Part, I consider 
whether this loss is reason enough to reject absolute immunity as a 
means of correcting DeShaney’s skewed incentives. 
IV.  The Competing Concerns of Compensation  
If we do not reliably know that absolute immunity will be an 
effective incentive for social workers to act decisively, the argument goes, 
then let it not stand in the way of compensation for parents (and 
children)194 who suffered unconstitutional infringements of their family 
integrity. Putting aside the fact that, on average, social workers get paid 
less than nurses, public school teachers, police officers, and firefighters,195 
a potentially serious objection to absolute immunity for caseworkers is 
that, regardless of DeShaney’s elimination of relief for Type II error, 
federal courts should continue to provide compensation for families 
harmed by Type I error. Absolute immunity, after all, insulates 
deliberate, even malicious violations of constitutional rights196 not only 
from liability, but from the scrutiny of the adversarial process. Even 
without absolute immunity, social workers would still be entitled to claim 
the defense of qualified immunity, protecting them from reasonable 
mistakes about what the law requires197 and providing insulation from 
personal liability unless they violated a federal right that was clearly 
established at the time of the challenged conduct.198 The Supreme Court 
 
 194. The extent to which children’s rights intersect with their parents’ rights has been the source of 
much judicial and scholarly comment. Some courts have held that a child’s right to family integrity is 
concomitant with that of a parent. See, e.g., Wooley v. City of Baton Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, 923 & n.46 
(5th Cir. 2000). Scholars have noted that a parent’s liberty interest in the care, custody, and 
management of her child also functions to protect a child’s interest in remaining with her biological 
parent. See Huntington, supra note 14, at 644 n.29. The Vermont Supreme Court has articulated the 
right in a way that captures this intuition: “the freedom of children and parents to relate to one 
another in the context of the family, free of governmental interference . . . .” In re N.H., 373 A.2d 851, 
856 (Vt. 1977). 
 195. See Am. Pub. Human Servs. Ass’n, supra note 159, at 19–20. 
 196. See Johns, supra note 73, at 55. 
 197. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001). 
 198. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638–39 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
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has expansively described qualified immunity as providing “ample 
protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 
violate the law.”199 
We have to ask: Why is qualified immunity not the better balance 
between the need to protect social worker decisionmaking and the goal 
of compensating individuals harmed by unjustified intrusions on their 
family’s privacy? In this context, the fairest inquiry is not to compare the 
harsh results of absolute immunity with the results of qualified immunity, 
by which the latter seems to be the more moderate and balanced 
approach, but to compare qualified immunity with DeShaney’s absolute 
ban on liability for social workers whose transgression is a failure to act. 
In this very specific context, how could qualified immunity, with its 
intractable indeterminacy, be enough to counteract the very clear 
application of DeShaney’s rule?200 
A. Qualified Immunity Is Indeterminate 
That qualified immunity is indeterminate has been amply 
demonstrated by a number of legal scholars.201 But for present purposes, 
there is perhaps no better illustration than that which appears in a 
periodical published for social workers. In an article explaining the 
difference between absolute and qualified immunity, and indicating in 
which jurisdictions each immunity defense may be used, the journal 
Social Work cautions its readers, 
[S]ocial workers . . . should be aware that their actions will be 
scrutinized before the courts will rule that they have qualified 
immunity. . . . [S]ocial workers must present more than just mere 
testimony that they thought the actions taken were right or that their 
professional training required the actions taken. They must convince a 
judge that their conduct did not violate clearly established rights that a 
reasonable person would have known.202 
 
800, 818 (1982). The Supreme Court has described qualified immunity as a “fair warning” standard. 
See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). As articulated by one lower court, “[public] [o]fficials are 
not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright lines.” Maciariello v. 
Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 199. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 
 200. That DeShaney’s rule is clear in application, at least in relation to other doctrines we might 
identify, is borne out by an examination of the cases in which it has been held to govern. See supra 
note 41.  
 201. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 150, at 263 (“[T]he Supreme Court has crafted this qualified 
immunity standard into a broad set of general guidelines that require lower courts to analyze 
immunity claims on a case-by-case basis.”). 
 202. Rudolph Alexander, Jr., Social Workers and Immunity from Civil Lawsuits, 40 Social Work 
648, 653 (1995). The National Association of Social Workers, the organization that publishes the 
journal, describes the journal as follows:  
Social Work is the premiere journal of the social work profession. Widely read by 
practitioners, faculty, and students, it is the official journal of NASW and is provided to all 
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This is, all told, a pretty accurate description of qualified 
immunity.203 Qualified immunity is highly fact-dependent, requiring the 
introduction of often voluminous amounts of evidence204 and 
correspondingly lengthy pretrial and discovery proceedings.205 Not only 
does the specter of prolonged scrutiny loom large, but social workers are 
correctly advised that their actions will not withstand scrutiny merely on 
the basis of good faith or professional judgment.206 Consequently, this 
brief description of qualified immunity, targeted towards social workers 
seeking to understand a conceptually difficult form of protection from 
liability, is not particularly reassuring. 
The rejoinder, of course, is that we do not want qualified immunity 
to be overly reassuring; indeed, one of the goals of official liability, even 
in its qualified form, is to deter unconstitutional conduct.207 But this is 
 
members as a membership benefit. Social Work is dedicated to improving practice and 
advancing knowledge in social work and social welfare. Its articles yield new insights into 
established practices, evaluate new techniques and research, examine current social 
problems, and bring serious critical analysis to bear on problems in the profession. Major 
emphasis is placed on social policy and the solutions to serious human problems.  
Social Work, NASW Press, http://www.naswpress.org/publications/journals/sw.html (last visited Dec. 
17, 2010). 
 203. The language of this excerpt suggests that the social worker defendant has the burden of 
establishing an entitlement to qualified immunity. It is quite right that qualified immunity is an 
affirmative defense and thus, the defendant has the burden of raising it; however, the circuits disagree 
as to which party has the ultimate burden of proof. The majority of circuits hold that once the 
defendant has raised the qualified immunity defense, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to 
demonstrate that the defendant violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time 
of the alleged conduct. See Martin A. Schwartz & Kathryn R. Urbonya, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Section 
1983 Litigation 151 (2d ed. 2008). The Second Circuit, however, requires the defendant to bear the 
burden of both pleading and proving an entitlement to qualified immunity. See Lee v. Sandberg, 
136 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 1997).  
 204. See Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 Emory L.J. 229, 230 (2006) 
(“[R]easonableness analyses inherently entail nuanced, fact-sensitive, case-by-case determinations 
involving the application of general legal principles to a particular context. The fact-intensive nature of 
these inquiries is exacerbated by the predominance of multifactored balancing tests in substantive 
constitutional law.”). Chen posits that the doctrine has become “not only internally inconsistent, but 
also extraordinarily difficult and costly to administer.” Id. at 230–31. 
 205. In Mitchell v. Forsyth, for example, pretrial proceedings and discovery lasted five and a half 
years. 472 U.S. 511, 515 (1985). 
 206. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816–18 (1982). Qualified immunity previously included 
both a subjective and an objective component; the Court abandoned the subjective good faith inquiry, 
because it made the doctrine too difficult to adjudicate at early stages of litigation. See id. While 
professional judgment is an element of some substantive constitutional inquiries, it is not a predicate 
for qualified immunity. Id. 
 207. Chen, supra note 150, at 263 (“Damages serve the complementary objectives of compensating 
the constitutional tort victim and of deterring not only the specific defendants but also other public 
officials from committing similar constitutional infractions in the future.”); James J. Park, The 
Constitutional Tort Action as Individual Remedy, 38 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 393, 400 (2003) 
(“Theoretically, constitutional tort actions should deter constitutional violations by raising their cost. 
If government officials commit constitutional torts, they will be subject to suits and forced to pay 
damage awards. By making conduct that violates the Constitution more costly, damage awards should 
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what makes qualified immunity a poor counterweight against DeShaney’s 
markedly skewed incentives.208 DeShaney completely eliminates liability 
for all failures to intervene; it functions as a one-sided absolute 
immunity, providing total insulation for inaction. Qualified immunity, on 
the other hand, at least theoretically retains enough of a threat to deter 
some subset of removals. 
B. Compensation for Parents Bringing Suit Under a Qualified 
Immunity Regime Is Nonetheless Extremely Difficult to Achieve 
We might begrudgingly accept this uneven state of affairs—an 
absolute ban on omission-liability paired with a qualified defense to act-
liability—in the name of providing some compensation to those harmed 
by affirmative conduct from overzealous caseworkers. Qualified 
 
increase the incentive of government officials to avoid such conduct. As a result, fewer individuals 
should be subject to constitutional rights deprivations.”); see also Thomas E. O’Brien, The Paradox of 
Qualified Immunity: How a Mechanical Application of the Objective Legal Reasonableness Test Can 
Undermine the Goal of Qualified Immunity, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 767, 767 (2004) (asserting that damage 
suits against government officials deter unlawful conduct). But see Daryl J. Levinson, Making 
Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 345, 
347 (2000) (arguing that the deterrence effects of constitutional tort actions are limited). 
 208. This same sort of indeterminacy is what makes insurance and indemnification policies 
inadequate responses to the incentive problem. Although these arrangements vary widely from state 
to state, they typically contain exclusions for actions committed in bad faith, variously phrased as 
“actual fraud, corruption, or malice”; “willful or wanton acts or omissions”; “willful misconduct”; 
“malice or criminal intent”; “malicious or fraudulent acts”; “gross negligence, fraud or malice” and so 
on. See Schuck, supra note 163, at 87 (internal quotation marks omitted). As Schuck argues: 
These exclusions, of course, are a source of great uncertainty for officials who face litigation, 
as they create potentially large lacunae in indemnification schemes. If denial of 
indemnification could be surgically limited to truly malicious officials held liable under 
§ 1983 (or under state law), wrongdoing could be deterred with little or no cost to vigorous 
decisionmaking. But where bad faith is not restricted to actual malice but can be based upon 
other factors about which officials may bear the burden of proof under a decidedly 
amorphous judicial standard, the threat to vigorous decisionmaking may be great. 
Id.; see also Gilles, supra note 162, at 30–31 (“[I]ndemnification provisions are themselves wrought 
with uncertainty and difficulties. . . . [I]ndemnification statutes invariably afford the municipality the 
unilateral option of disclaiming coverage in broad categories of cases.”). For a rather counterintuitive 
take on the incomplete nature of indemnification, see K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 
850 (7th Cir. 1990). Judge Posner begins by arguing that the familiar justification for official immunity 
becomes strained when a “governmental entity indemnifies its employees for damages and other 
expenses that they incur in defending against suits that complain about their performance of official 
duties.” Id. He recognizes that “[t]he indemnity is not always complete, and some governmental 
entities provide no indemnity, the federal government being a prominent example.” Id. Judge Posner 
then suggests:  
[I]f the public employer itself,  by refusing to indemnify its employees for torts committed 
in the course of public employment—or the legislature, by refusing to authorize indemnity, 
out of concern with the public fisc—manifests indifference to the disincentive effects of tort 
liability, it may be questioned whether the courts should worry about those effects and seek 
to offset them.  
Id. 
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immunity, however, is becoming an increasingly difficult hurdle for 
plaintiffs to overcome. The Court has made it clear that it views qualified 
immunity not merely as immunity from damages, but as an immunity 
from suit,209 and the Justices have continually reworked and adjusted the 
doctrine to satisfy that objective. An important example is the 
availability of interlocutory appeal from denials of qualified immunity,210 
a procedural innovation that keeps § 1983 plaintiffs away from juries.211 
Added to this are decisions that occupy the nether region between 
procedural and substantive; recall that for a plaintiff to overcome 
qualified immunity, the constitutional right she is asserting must have 
been clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.212 In 
elaborating on this requirement, the Supreme Court has cautioned that 
the right in question must have been established in a fairly particularized 
sense:  
[T]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable 
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This 
is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity 
unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, 
but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness 
must be apparent.213 
While the Court rejected a circuit court’s requirement that the facts of 
existing precedent be “materially similar,”214 it has demanded close 
factual correspondence between the preexisting law invoked by a 
plaintiff and the facts of her own case.215 
Thus, the first challenge for a parent who seeks damages against a 
social worker is the same as that of any § 1983 plaintiff: She might be the 
first to show up in court with her particular type of constitutional 
challenge.216 In fact, even if other plaintiffs have previously asserted such 
a claim, she may not be able to point to clearly established law; if courts 
 
 209. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). 
 210. Id. at 527; see also Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 306 (1996); Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 
304, 313 (1995) (recognizing Mitchell as establishing that interlocutory appeal is appropriate where the 
question to be decided is legal, not factual). 
 211. See Mark R. Brown, The Rise and Fall of Qualified Immunity: From Hope to Harris, 9 Nev. 
L.J. 185, 194–96 (2008); Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and 
the Role of Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 21–22 (1997); Allen H. Denson, 
Comment, Neither Clear nor Established: The Problem with Objective Legal Reasonableness, 59 Ala. 
L. Rev. 747, 762 (2008). 
 212. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 
 213. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (citation omitted).  
 214. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002). 
 215. See id. at 739–41. 
 216. See, e.g., Kiser v. Garrett, 67 F.3d 1166, 1174 (5th Cir. 1995) (reasoning that where plaintiff’s 
father asserted that his due process rights were violated by the social workers’ failure to disclose 
exculpatory evidence, even if that right existed, it was not clearly established at the time of the state 
court custody proceedings).  
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faced with that constitutional claim have previously declined to elucidate 
the contours of a right,217 it may well remain insufficiently established for 
her to overcome qualified immunity. At best, she may obtain a ruling 
vindicating her assertion that her constitutional rights were violated,218 
but she will not receive damages from the individual official who caused 
the constitutional deprivation.219 
Parents seeking damages for claims arising from child protection 
proceedings face an even steeper climb, arising out of the particular 
constitutional right they seek to vindicate. Unless they can successfully 
assert that their child was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s 
reasonableness requirement,220 or that the removal of their child was not 
accompanied by constitutionally adequate procedural safeguards,221 
parents will, by and large, rely on substantive due process, arguing that 
the state’s intervention violated their fundamental liberty interest in the 
care and custody of their children.222 The Supreme Court first identified 
such a right more than eighty years ago, along with the corresponding 
acknowledgment that states nonetheless retain a great deal of authority 
under their police power to regulate the physical, mental, and moral 
 
 217. To address concerns that the law would never develop if courts could repeatedly refuse to 
state whether a certain type of conduct was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court suggested and then 
required that lower courts first decide whether the plaintiff had suffered a constitutional violation 
while assessing a defendant’s entitlement to qualified immunity. See Sam Kamin, An Article III 
Defense of Merits-First Decisionmaking in Civil Rights Litigation: The Continued Viability of Saucier v. 
Katz, 16 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 53, 53–54 (2008). Only if the defendant’s conduct was determined to be 
unconstitutional would the court then proceed to inquire whether that was clearly established at the 
time of the challenged conduct. Id. The “order-of-decisionmaking” rule was widely criticized, see id. at 
54, and the Court recently abandoned it in Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009). 
 218. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2644 (2009) (“The strip 
search of Savana Redding was . . . [unconstitutional], but petitioners . . . are nevertheless protected 
from liability through qualified immunity.”). 
 219. Only under very limited circumstances might she obtain damages from the entity that 
employs the officer. States enjoy sovereign immunity from suits brought pursuant to § 1983. While 
qualified immunity protects only individual officials and not entities, there is no respondeat superior 
liability under § 1983; an agency or municipality thus can only be liable for damages if the 
constitutional violation occurred pursuant to official policy or custom. See Aviel, supra note 52, at 222–
24. 
 220. The Third and Ninth Circuits have held that a social worker must satisfy the warrant and 
probable cause requirements to conduct a strip search of a child. See Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808, 
817–18 (9th Cir. 1999); Good v. Dauphin Cnty. Soc. Servs. for Children & Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1092 
(3d Cir. 1989); see also Roe v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 407–08 (5th 
Cir. 2002) (stating that a social worker needs a warrant, the parent must give permission, or there must 
exist exigent circumstances to subject a child to a visual body cavity search); Tenenbaum v. Williams, 
193 F.3d 581, 604–05 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that social workers must obtain judicial approval to have 
physician perform gynecological exam on child without parental permission). 
 221. See, e.g., Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 828 (2d Cir. 1977); cf. Croft v. Westmoreland 
Cnty. Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1126 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that a procedural due 
process issue was raised by an agency’s policy of removing a suspected parent from the family home, 
without any procedural safeguards, while child abuse investigations were pending). 
 222. See, e.g., Abdouch v. Burger, 426 F.3d 982, 987–88 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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well-being of their citizens.223 But it continually revisited the fraught 
relationship between a parent’s liberty interest and the State’s parens 
patriae authority in contexts that did little to illustrate the contours of the 
constitutional right, resolving disputes over parents’ asserted prerogative 
to have their children learn a foreign language before the age of 
fourteen,224 attend private school,225 accompany a parent engaged in 
religious proselytizing,226 or withdraw from school after eighth grade to 
participate in the Amish community.227 In deciding these rather fact-
specific cases, the Court continually reiterated the abstract principle that 
parents enjoy a fundamental right that is limited by the state’s parens 
patriae obligation, but provided no analytical framework for how these 
interests should be balanced against each other when they were shown to 
be in conflict. 
Although later cases gave rise to more workable principles with 
broader application, such as the notion that a state cannot terminate 
parental rights absent a showing of parental unfitness,228 these precedents 
still could be seen as falling short of providing the sort of “close factual 
correspondence” that would allow damages to be awarded to parents, 
who, for example, had their children returned to them following a 
prolonged and assertedly unjustified separation. If the Constitution 
forbids the state from terminating parental rights absent a showing of 
parental unfitness, what does it say to the State about the suspension of 
these rights when a child is temporarily placed in State custody over the 
objection of her parents? What sort of showing does that require? Does 
the State’s demonstrative burden increase along with the length of 
separation? 
Rather than attempting to venture some answers and await 
correction or confirmation from the Supreme Court, in a process that 
would eventually build a “clearly established” law of constitutional 
obligations in the child welfare context, many of the lower courts have 
concluded that the competing interests that need to be balanced against 
each other vitiate not only the existence but also the possibility of clear 
principles in this area.229 These opinions have suggested that the right to 
 
 223. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923). 
 224. Id. at 397. 
 225. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530 (1925). 
 226. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 159–60 (1944). 
 227. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972). 
 228. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651–52 (1972) (reinforcing the idea, under the rubric of 
procedural due process and equal protection, that a parent’s liberty interest is limited by the state’s 
interest in child welfare, and suggesting that the State may not interpose itself simply because it has a 
different idea of what is best for the child, but rather must justify its intervention by a showing of 
harm). 
 229. See Brokaw v. Mercer Cnty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1023 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Tenenbaum v. 
Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 596 (2d Cir. 1999); Kiser v. Garrett, 67 F.3d 1166, 1169–74 (5th Cir. 1995); Doe 
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family integrity is inherently nebulous, such that any alleged 
constitutional violation stemming from a child’s removal “will rarely—if 
ever—be clearly established.”230 In gearing up for such a conclusion, a 
court begins by noting that a parent’s liberty interest in the care and 
custody of her children is limited by the state’s “potentially conflicting, 
compelling interest in the safety and welfare of the children.”231 The court 
then observes that it must “weigh the interests of the state and child 
against those of the parents to determine whether a constitutional 
violation has occurred.”232 The disabling conclusion for the parent is the 
notion that “[t]he need to continually subject the assertion of this 
abstract substantive due process right to a balancing test . . . makes the 
qualified immunity defense difficult to overcome.”233 
It is rather remarkable to witness federal courts repeatedly 
suggesting that as a matter of law, a constitutional right is beyond 
workable articulation—that not only was it not clearly established at the 
time of the alleged violation, but it never will be. This deserves its own 
entry in the “right without remedy” pantheon.234  At least one court has 
made explicit the logical conclusion: If the courts cannot articulate what 
the Constitution requires in these circumstances, then it will, as a matter 
of course, be “difficult, if not impossible, for officials” to know what they 
must do to comply.235 The underlying premise, that not only will the law 
never be clear enough to justify damages, but that violations of this very 
theoretical right are inevitable, is troubling. In short, in the unanswered 
questions left by the Supreme Court’s parental rights jurisprudence, 
lower courts have found a license to declare the right intrinsically 
unknowable and therefore unredressable through damages actions.236 
Thus, qualified immunity looks capacious next to absolute 
immunity, especially from the social worker’s perspective, but it offers 
very slim prospects for recovery in the child welfare context, producing 
exactly that dynamic Schuck described twenty years ago: “[T]he 
subjectively perceived risks of litigation loom far greater than the 
 
v. Louisiana, 2 F.3d 1412, 1417–18 (5th Cir. 1993); Frazier v. Bailey, 957 F.2d 920, 929–31 (1st Cir. 
1992); Hodorowski v. Ray, 844 F.2d 1210, 1216–17 (5th Cir. 1988)). 
 230. Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1023. 
 231. Abdouch v. Burger, 426 F.3d 982, 987 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Manzano v. S.D. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 60 F.3d 505, 510 (8th Cir. 1995)). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. (quoting Manzano, 60 F.3d at 510) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 234. See Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1, 3–4 (2002) 
(reviewing doctrines that drive a wedge between a violation of rights and a remedy for the violation). 
 235. Frazier v. Bailey, 957 F.2d 920, 931 (1st Cir. 1992). 
 236. The Second Circuit has made an effort to articulate constitutional standards in this context. 
See Wilkinson v. Russell, 182 F.3d 89, 103 (2d Cir. 1999) (relying on an objective reasonableness 
standard). 
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objective probability of liability alone would suggest.”237 The 
indeterminacy of qualified immunity makes it burdensome to litigate and 
leaves open the possibility, however remote, of damages. For this reason, 
qualified immunity fails to assuage whatever fear of liability might be 
motivating social workers to inaction, while at the same time failing to 
provide compensation to the vast majority of families wronged. This is 
the worst of possible worlds, generating the overdeterrence that has 
worried courts and scholars about constitutional tort liability,238 without 
the compensation that is supposedly its primary objective.239 Against this 
very low bar, absolute immunity starts to look a little better, for all of its 
troubling aspects. 
C. While Absolute Immunity Would Eliminate Compensation for a 
Subset of Plaintiffs Who Could Overcome Qualified Immunity, 
DESHANEY Requires This Painful Choice 
To this point, I have argued that our concern that absolute 
immunity eliminates compensation for victims of constitutional torts is 
more powerful in the abstract than when evaluated against the actual 
prospects of recovery under a qualified immunity scheme. But there are 
families who would be able to recover damages for violations of their 
constitutional rights under a qualified immunity scheme.240 Even if we 
were to focus on this narrow swath of families for whom absolute 
immunity eliminates recovery that would otherwise be available, 
absolute immunity remains the necessary but painful choice. 
To see why, it is useful to break down the various categories of 
individuals who have rights against the State when it comes to social 
worker intrusion into the family. There are abused children and their 
parents, and there are non-abused children and their parents.241 The 
constitutional rights that might form the basis of a § 1983 claim against a 
social worker, limited as they are to negative liberties against state 
interference, are not of equal value or force to these different categories 
of rights-holders.242 Children in abusive homes benefit very little from 
 
 237. Schuck, supra note 163, at 80–81. 
 238. See supra note 162. 
 239. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139 (1988). 
 240. See, e.g., Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 923–24 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that one of the 
defendants could be liable because the relevant law was clearly established). 
 241. The reader will quickly see that for this Part, I do not engage two enormously difficult 
questions: (1) where the line is drawn, and (2) how the social worker is supposed to know which 
families are on which side of the line. I simply assume that families fall into one category or the other, 
so as to illustrate that (1) constitutional rights operate differently on either side of the line, and (2) 
what happens on one side of the line may affect what happens on the other side of the line in harmful 
and unintended ways. 
 242. “Rights, constitutional and otherwise, do not exist in a vacuum. Their purpose is to protect 
persons from injuries to particular interests, and their contours are shaped by the interests they 
Aviel_62-HLJ-401.doc (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2011 12:16 PM 
December 2010]           RESTORING EQUIPOISE TO CHILD WELFARE 447 
their negative liberties.243 A brutalized four-year-old’s right to be left 
alone is a meager right indeed. It is worse than meager; it is meaningless, 
even cruel.244 
Negative liberties are worth more to their parents, of course; indeed, 
an important body of scholarship criticizes our scheme of negative 
liberties on the grounds that such a regime insulates private hierarchies 
and empowers the strong to subordinate the weak within these private 
spheres.245 On the other hand, most abusive parents are desperately poor 
and themselves would benefit from affirmative state assistance rather 
than from the presumption of privacy that negative liberties provide.246 
In any event, putting aside the somewhat difficult question of 
whether abusive parents benefit or suffer from the insulating effect of 
negative liberties,247 as a doctrinal matter, abusive parents forfeit their 
negative liberties against state intervention upon harming their child. As 
discussed above, the liberty interest in familial integrity is limited by the 
compelling governmental interest in the protection of children, 
particularly where the children need to be protected from their own 
 
protect.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978). 
 243. The Supreme Court has instructed that “the abstract value of a constitutional right may not 
form the basis for § 1983 damages.” Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986). 
 244. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse 
74–75 (1991) (“By exalting autonomy to the degree we do, we systematically slight the very young, the 
severely ill or disabled, the frail elderly, as well as those who care for them—and impair their own 
ability to be free and independent in so doing. . . . The exceptional solitariness of the American rights-
bearer is but one aspect of the hyperindividualism that pervades our American right dialect.”). 
 245. See West, Rights, supra note 62, at xv; see also Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Storming the 
Castle to Save the Children: The Ironic Costs of a Child Welfare Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 
47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 413, 421 (2005) (“Enabled and then protected by liberalism’s doctrine of 
parental autonomy, adults sometimes cause great harm to their children.”); Judith G. McMullen, 
Privacy, Family Autonomy, and the Maltreated Child, 75 Marq. L. Rev. 569, 569 (1992) (“Attempts to 
accommodate family autonomy and privacy interests have significantly compromised the protection of 
our children . . . .”); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Children’s Rights: The Destruction and Promise of 
Family, 1993 BYU L. Rev. 497, 511 (“As women and children know best, family privacy can be 
oppressive as well as protective.”). 
 246. See Garrison, supra note 17, at 1790–91 (“[C]hildren served by the child welfare 
system . . . typically live in extreme poverty, in inadequate housing, with inadequate social and 
community supports. Most parents show massive disability in their functioning, and many are mentally 
ill, alcoholic, or addicted to drugs. Frequently, they or their children have chronic physical illnesses. 
They are seldom employed and poorly educated. Multiple stresses and severe deprivation overwhelm 
these families, with the result that many parents become unable to cope with their children.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 247. See James G. Dwyer, Children’s Interests in a Family Context—A Cautionary Note, 39 Santa 
Clara L. Rev. 1053, 1071–72 (1999) (“[P]arents do not benefit from being able to abuse their 
children. . . . [W]here parents’ impulses toward abusive conduct are destroying their relationship with 
their children, the parents themselves would benefit from intervention that can help them get on a 
different track, a track that leads to a mutually rewarding relationship with their offspring. It is 
therefore a mistake, I think, to view state intervention in abuse situations as always ‘for’ the child and 
‘against’ the parent. Parents share with children an interest in receiving appropriate state 
intervention.”). 
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parents.248 While a parent’s liberty interest in the care of her children 
does not “evaporate” simply because she has not been a “model 
parent,”249 no court would hold that a truly abusive parent whose child is 
removed from her custody has suffered an unconstitutional intrusion on 
the right to family integrity. However unsure we might be about the 
parameters of the right, we know that it simply does not include the right 
to abuse one’s children without state intervention. In short, it is not for 
these families that we need to maintain compensatory damages; the 
State’s intervention does not give rise to a constitutional cause of action 
in these scenarios. 
On the other hand, children in non-abusive homes do benefit 
enormously from their negative liberties, as do their parents. Negative 
liberties keep the state from separating these families without cause. As 
some family preservationists have reminded us so passionately, an 
unwarranted intrusion is not merely a violation of the parents’ rights 
against the state, it is a serious threat to the child’s well-being and a 
predicate for potentially devastating harms.250 Negative liberties block 
the meddlesome State from intruding on family integrity, a right that is 
truly precious in those families for whom there is insufficient cause to 
intervene. Absolute immunity would prevent these children and their 
parents from seeking damages for their wrongful separation, and that is a 
cost that cannot be taken lightly, however unlikely it might be that these 
families could surmount the defense of qualified immunity and actually 
receive a judgment entitling them to compensation from the offending 
social worker. 
The problem, as illustrated by the vignette at the very beginning of 
this Article, is that it is not always easy to tell which families fall into 
which category; in fact, it can be extraordinarily difficult. And if 
immunity doctrines work in the way the courts and many scholars have 
assumed,251 then the availability of damages for non-abused children who 
were wrongfully removed will chill social worker conduct with regards to 
abused children who should be removed. The latter group suffers from 
the fact that after DeShaney, social workers face no federal liability for 
failing to act. Since liability attaches only to affirmative conduct, social 
workers might reflect unduly on the damages available to non-abused 
children, erroneously removed from their homes, before making a 
decision to remove an abused child. 
 
 248. See Abdouch v. Burger, 426 F.3d 982, 987 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 249. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). 
 250. See, e.g., Martin Guggenheim, What’s Wrong with Children’s Rights 192–96 (2005) 
(“Children do not thrive in foster care. The state is a poor substitute for one’s family.”). 
 251. See supra note 162. 
Aviel_62-HLJ-401.doc (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2011 12:16 PM 
December 2010]           RESTORING EQUIPOISE TO CHILD WELFARE 449 
The question then becomes whether abused children have a greater 
claim to protective removal than non-abused children and their parents 
have to compensatory damages. I argue that the unfortunate answer is 
yes, and this is the essence of my contention: Absolute immunity shields 
the abused child’s claim to protective removal from what might 
otherwise be the effect of DeShaney’s regrettable calculus. If this sounds 
like the sort of “freewheeling policy choice”252 that the Supreme Court 
has professed to eschew in its immunity jurisprudence, well, perhaps it 
is.253 But in DeShaney’s long shadow, what a painfully unremarkable, 
unambitious policy choice it turns out to be: simply, that a social worker 
should face equal incentives on both sides of a removal decision. 
V.  Delineating the Parameters 
Once the choice for absolute immunity is made, it is critical to 
circumscribe its parameters. As discussed in preceding Parts, Butz v. 
Economou, the one case in which the Supreme Court has explicitly 
extended absolute immunity to officials based on function rather than 
job title, has done little to illuminate for the lower courts any viable 
method for assessing whether a particular type of public official engages 
in conduct that is functionally analogous to that of a prosecutor.254 But it 
does provide some guidance as to the aspects of a social worker’s role for 
which absolute immunity might be appropriate. The Court placed a great 
deal of emphasis on the procedural safeguards in administrative 
adjudications that enhance reliable decisionmaking and protect 
constitutional rights in the first instance, reducing the need for private 
damages actions after the fact as a means of “controlling unconstitutional 
conduct.”255 These safeguards—opportunities to present evidence, 
adversarial testing, adjudication by a neutral decisionmaker, and 
appellate review—are essential predicates to an absolute immunity 
scheme that maintains a minimal commitment to constitutional rights.256 
If there is any sort of limiting principle to be found in the Court’s 
pronouncement that absolute immunity covers only that conduct 
“intimately associated” with judicial proceedings, it inheres in the 
 
 252. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986). 
 253. See Chen, supra note 150, at 271 n.50 (reviewing scholarly work that characterizes the Court’s 
immunity jurisprudence as “unabashedly policy-based”). 
 254. See supra Part II.B. 
 255. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978). 
 256. See Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing”, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1279–95 (1975). 
Judge Friendly proposed the following as elements of a fair hearing: an unbiased tribunal; notice of the 
proposed action and the grounds asserted for it; an opportunity to present reasons why the proposed 
action should not be taken; the right to call witnesses; the right to know the evidence against one; a 
decision based only on the evidence presented; an opportunity for representation by counsel; the 
making of a record and a statement of reasons; public attendance; and judicial review. See id. 
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presence of these safeguards, which both describe, as a doctrinal matter, 
when absolute immunity attaches, and justify, as a normative matter, 
absolute immunity’s affront to the principle that every violation of a legal 
right must have a remedy.257 
In the child welfare context, then, absolute immunity would attach 
upon a social worker’s formal initiation of dependency proceedings, in 
accordance with the procedures specified by state law. The immunity 
should include presenting evidence to support the petition, making 
recommendations to the court, and executing orders obtained as a result 
of the filing of the petition—including, most notably, a court’s order to 
remove a child from her parent’s home. The investigative conduct that 
precedes a social worker’s decision to initiate judicial proceedings should 
remain outside the scope of absolute immunity. These investigations 
present the threat of serious invasions of privacy,258 are largely 
unsupervised by the courts, and do not trigger a right to counsel.259 For 
the same reasons, absolute immunity should not attach to warrantless 
emergency removals, or to those authorized following an ex parte 
hearing.260 As these emergency removals have been criticized as 
 
 257. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“[I]t is a general and indisputable 
rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever 
that right is invaded.” (quoting 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *23)). The rights-remedies gap 
in constitutional law is so pervasive, and has been so well documented, that Justice Marshall’s famous 
pronouncement can hardly be invoked without a bit of irony. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries Jr., The Right-
Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 Yale L.J. 87, 87 (1999) (“Ever since John Marshall insisted 
that for every violation of a right, there must be a remedy, American constitutionalists have decried 
the right-remedy gap in constitutional law.”). That said, some doctrines offend this principle more 
nakedly than others, absolute immunity being chief among them. 
 258. Coleman, supra note 245, at 436–41. 
 259. Buss, supra note 116, at 433–34. (“Investigations of abuse and neglect reports are routinely 
done by case workers with little or no specialized training in how to approach the families, how to 
conduct an effective and appropriate investigation, and how to assess the information uncovered. 
These investigations are inherently coercive because parents know that whether or not they can keep 
their children hangs in the balance. Cooperation is therefore at a premium. In this context, it is not 
surprising that parents who under most circumstances would never consent to a strip search of their 
children by a stranger, would give their consent to an abuse investigator, for fear that failure to agree 
would translate into an admission that they had something to hide. Parents are forced to respond to 
these coercive investigations without the assistance of lawyers or the supervision of judges.”). 
 260. This stays true to the Supreme Court’s own parsing of the difference between a police officer 
applying for a warrant and a prosecutor seeking an indictment. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 
342–43 (1986); see also Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 128 (1997). After the Court announced in 
Imbler v. Pachtman that prosecutors have absolute immunity for functions intimately associated with 
the judicial process, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976), a police officer who had been sued for obtaining a search 
warrant that was allegedly unsupported by probable cause argued that this was conduct intimately 
associated with the judicial process and thus, covered by absolute immunity under Imbler’s rationale. 
See Malley, 475 U.S. at 341–42. The Supreme Court rejected the analogy on the grounds that applying 
for a search warrant is too far removed from the actual criminal prosecution to be covered by 
prosecutorial immunity: 
We intend no disrespect to the officer applying for a warrant by observing that his action, 
while a vital part of the administration of criminal justice, is further removed from the 
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particularly prone to error, traumatic for children, and difficult to reverse 
in subsequent stages of the child protection process, we might be 
interested in encouraging social workers to forego these emergency 
removals in the majority of cases.261 Similarly, we might welcome 
incentives for social workers to reduce reliance on informal “voluntary” 
arrangements that operate in coercive ways and remain outside the scope 
of judicial scrutiny and its attendant safeguards.262 
A shrewd observer might note that a social worker would thus have 
an incentive to hurry to the courthouse, cutting short an investigation for 
which she is protected only by qualified immunity and rushing to file a 
petition that brings her the full protection of absolute immunity.263 But 
this contains its own check: At least in theory, a petition that is 
unsupported by sufficient evidence will be vulnerable to serious 
challenge by a parent’s attorney, or the child’s guardian ad litem, and 
subject to dismissal by the dependency court judge. That is why it 
matters that absolute immunity would insulate only the forms of social 
worker conduct that are judicially supervised and reflect indicia of the 
adversarial process.264 
Also exempted from absolute immunity should be any and all 
failures by the State to protect the welfare of children in the State’s foster 
care system.265 Both the Fourth and the Seventh Circuits provide 
examples of this approach, extending absolute immunity to social 
workers for the decision to initiate child dependency proceedings266 but 
applying qualified immunity to claims against social workers arising from 
harms suffered by children while in foster care.267 While the Fourth 
 
judicial phase of criminal proceedings than the act of a prosecutor in seeking an indictment. 
Furthermore, petitioner’s analogy, while it has some force, does not take account of the fact 
that the prosecutor’s act in seeking an indictment is but the first step in the process of 
seeking a conviction. Exposing the prosecutor to liability for the initial phase of his 
prosecutorial work could interfere with his exercise of independent judgment at every phase 
of his work, since the prosecutor might come to see later decisions in terms of their effect on 
his potential liability. Thus, we shield the prosecutor seeking an indictment because any 
lesser immunity could impair the performance of a central actor in the judicial process. 
Id. at 342–43. 
 261. See Chill, supra note 16, at 541. 
 262. See Katherine C. Pearson, Cooperate or We’ll Take Your Child: The Parents’ Fictional 
Voluntary Separation Decision and a Proposal for Change, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 835, 836 (1998).  
 263. Thanks are due to Alan Chen for this observation. 
 264. What’s trickier is what happens when social workers present fabricated evidence. The Ninth 
Circuit has recently narrowed the scope of social worker immunity to eliminate this type of conduct 
from absolute protection. See Beltran v. Santa Clara Cnty., 514 F.3d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 265. The problem of children being abused and neglected while in foster care is grave, growing, 
and well documented. See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 14, at 662. 
 266. See Millspaugh v. Cnty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 937 F.2d 1172, 1176 (7th Cir. 1991); Vosburg v. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 884 F.2d 133, 137–38 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 267. See White ex rel. White v. Chambliss, 112 F.3d 731 736–37 (4th Cir. 1997); K.H. ex rel. Murphy 
v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 854 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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Circuit has done so without explaining this distinction, the Seventh 
Circuit has provided some insight, noting that state courts rarely, if ever, 
delineate the particular foster care home or institution into which a child 
should be placed.268 The inspection and licensing of foster homes, the 
initial placement of a child in a particular home, the transfer of a child 
from one foster home to another, and all too often, to many more, all 
take place outside the purview of judicially supervised, adversarial 
proceedings with the safeguards extolled in Butz.269 A social worker’s 
management of a child’s foster care placements is administrative conduct 
that is too far removed from the judicial process to be covered by 
absolute immunity.270 
This proposed framework has two serious shortcomings. First, it 
rests on assumptions that are only as strong as judicial review itself. 
Absolute immunity is a judicially created doctrine and reflects a deep 
trust in the adversary process conducted under judicial supervision; it 
requires an abiding faith in the procedural safeguards that attend judicial 
proceedings. It has been amply demonstrated that this faith is not always 
justified; dependency court, in particular, has been described as a 
“grossly overburdened and underfunded system that resides at the 
bottom of the judicial hierarchy.”271 A Third Circuit case, for example, 
reveals that five years of judicial supervision by the Chester County 
Court of Common Pleas were insufficient to alert the court to the fact 
that social workers recommended against family reunification out of 
personal animosity, rather than on the basis of professional concerns for 
the well-being of the child.272 Judges, like social workers, err grievously in 
the other direction as well, granting inexplicably unfounded requests to 
discharge dependency petitions that are supported by overwhelming 
evidence.273 The trust placed in judicial review is obviously and 
inescapably aspirational, but it is an aspiration of almost unparalleled 
importance in our constitutional system. It is the essence of due process; 
it is consistent with our constitutional values and traditions that absolute 
immunity for social workers, as well as other officials, be limited to 
proceedings that are conducted under judicial review.  
The more serious shortcoming, in my view, is that this parsing of the 
various stages of a social worker’s professional involvement with a child 
 
 268. K.H., 914 F.2d at 868 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 269. Cf. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978). 
 270. See supra Part II. 
 271. Kathleen S. Bean, Changing the Rules: Public Access to Dependency Court, 79 Denv. U. L. 
Rev. 1, 50 (2001). 
 272. See Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486, 489–90, 504 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 273. See S.S. ex rel. Jervis v. McMullen, 225 F.3d 960, 962 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal even 
though plaintiff alleged defendants knew that her father allowed her to have contact with a known 
pedophile). 
Aviel_62-HLJ-401.doc (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2011 12:16 PM 
December 2010]           RESTORING EQUIPOISE TO CHILD WELFARE 453 
comes at some cost to clarity, as has been embarrassingly evident with 
prosecutorial immunity.274 The more complicated a regime, the more 
uncertainty it produces with respect to the types of conduct that 
engender each level of protection, and the less likely it is to achieve its 
objectives. If child welfare workers do not understand which of their 
functions are absolutely protected and which might require them to 
“convince a judge that their conduct did not violate clearly established 
rights that a reasonable person would have known,”275 the absolute 
immunity they receive for some of their conduct will serve only as a 
barrier to relief, rather than as an instrument for vigorous 
decisionmaking.276 
As awkward as prosecutorial immunity has become, however, the 
Court retains it because it is so committed to the position that 
prosecutors require freedom from liability to exercise fully their 
independent judgment about who and when to prosecute and how to 
present a case in court.277 And the Court retains the functional analysis, in 
spite of the confusion it has generated, to avoid overbreadth—to allow 
damages suits to proceed against prosecutors for conduct that does not 
directly implicate these concerns.278 This same tension is in play for social 
workers who are making a decision about whether to initiate child 
dependency proceedings, with the added dynamic that, unlike 
prosecutors, who represent the public at large, social workers are tasked 
with protecting specific identified children, known to the State to be 
vulnerable, at risk of harm, and in need of care. 
For all its complexity, the absolute immunity doctrine allows courts 
to resolve most claims that fall within its scope on the pleadings.279 To the 
extent that qualified immunity lacks the modicum of clarity provided by 
 
 274. Prosecutorial conduct covered by absolute immunity includes initiating criminal proceedings, 
knowingly introducing false testimony, and suppressing exculpatory evidence. See supra Part II.A. 
Actions taken by prosecutors that have not been categorized under the prosecutorial mantle, and 
which are subject to a qualified rather than absolute immunity defense, include shopping for an expert 
witness who would give the desired opinion regarding some forensic evidence, giving a press 
conference announcing that there was evidence tying the defendant to the murder, and fabricating 
evidence as part of the pre-prosecution investigation. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 262 
(1993). Perhaps the hallmark of absurdity is Burns v. Reed, in which the Supreme Court determined 
that a prosecutor was entitled only to qualified immunity after advising a police officer that a suspect 
could be hypnotized but was entitled to absolute immunity for introducing into evidence at trial the 
confession produced by the selfsame hypnosis. 500 U.S. 478, 492, 496 (1991). 
 275. See supra note 202. 
 276. See Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 Duke L.J. 
1, 45 (1992) (“Call it the ‘audience principle.’ It holds that the complexity of a rule should be tailored 
to the sophistication and cost-bearing capacities of those who will have to interpret and implement it.” 
(citing Boris I. Bittker, Tax Reform and Tax Simplification, 29 U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 5 (1974))). 
 277. See supra Part II.A. 
 278. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 126 (1997). 
 279. See Chen, supra note 204, at 234–35. 
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absolute immunity, without the corresponding prospect of actual 
recovery for parent victims of unconstitutional conduct, it is worse.280 
Conclusion 
In arguing that social workers should be entitled to absolute 
immunity for their decisions to seek custody of an endangered child, I 
have no intention of obscuring absolute immunity’s shortcomings. 
Indeed, as I have discussed at length, absolute immunity for social 
workers, as articulated by the courts that have chosen it, is predicated on 
a weak and unexamined analogy to prosecutors. The policy arguments in 
its favor are premised on sixty years of unsubstantiated judicial and 
scholarly intuition about what motivates and inhibits public officials in 
the discharge of their duties. These intuitions may or may not reflect the 
truth about prosecutors in the first place and, whether true or untrue 
with regards to prosecutors, may be entirely different for child welfare 
workers. What we do know is that prosecutorial immunity has been more 
difficult to adjudicate and administer than it initially promised to be. And 
although qualified immunity presents nearly insurmountable hurdles for 
most parents seeking constitutional damages against social workers, 
there will be some cases in which the difference between qualified and 
absolute immunity will be outcome-determinative.281 For these plaintiffs, 
absolute immunity eliminates not only damages relief, but also an 
opportunity to be heard about the constitutional violations they suffered. 
My argument is simply that we should prefer these defects to a 
system that gives social workers reason to view intervention as a riskier 
endeavor than standing by and doing nothing.282 To make peace with a 
system in which social workers can be held liable for removing a child 
from a potentially dangerous home but not for leaving him there, one 
would have to be willing to assert that social workers are completely 
impervious to the differential incentives created by such a lopsided 
liability scheme. I am willing to acknowledge this possibility. But in the 
absence of empirical evidence to support it, it is a bold and dangerous 
proposition. The cost of it being wrong—even for just one abused child 
whose overworked, underpaid caseworker is unreasonably afraid of 
being sued—is very high. In contrast, conferring absolute immunity on 
social workers in the limited way that I have proposed fits comfortably 
within current immunity jurisprudence and eliminates recovery for only 
that very narrow group of plaintiffs who would be able to surmount both 
the hurdle of qualified immunity and DeShaney’s substantive limitations. 
 
 280. See supra Part IV.B. 
 281. See supra Part IV.C. 
 282. See supra Part I. 
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The essential point is this: Until we have reliable empirical data that 
tells us whether social worker decisionmaking is influenced by a fear of 
liability, we have to assume either that it is or that it is not. In my view, 
the vulnerability of the children who depend on this system makes the 
latter assumption unacceptable. We should strive to equalize the 
incentives on either side of a removal decision unless and until we know 
that such parity is unnecessary. Absolute immunity, for all its flaws, can 
restore that equipoise. 
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